

NATO 2030: A CELEBRATION OF ORIGINS AND
AN EYE TOWARD THE FUTURE
(E3C SUBCOMMITTEE—NATO PARLIAMEN-
TARY ASSEMBLY JOINT HEARING)

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, ENERGY, THE
ENVIRONMENT AND CYBER

OF THE

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**NATO 2030: A CELEBRATION OF ORIGINS AND
AN EYE TOWARD THE FUTURE
(E3C SUBCOMMITTEE—NATO PARLIAMEN-
TARY ASSEMBLY JOINT HEARING)**

Thursday, June 24, 2021

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, ENERGY, THE
ENVIRONMENT AND CYBER,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., via Webex, Hon. William R. Keating (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. KEATING. The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee will come to order.

Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess of the committee at any point and all members will have 5 days to submit statements, extraneous materials, and questions for the record, subject to the length limitation in the rules.

To insert something into the record, please have your staff email the previously mentioned address and contact full committee staff.

Please keep your video function on at all times, even when you're not recognized by the chair. Members are responsible for muting and unmuting themselves, and please remember to mute yourself after you finish speaking.

Consistent with House Res. 965 and the accompanying regulations, staff will only mute members and witnesses as appropriate when they are not under recognition to eliminate the background noise.

I will note that we have a hard stop today at 12 p.m. So I ask the witnesses and my colleagues to keep their remarks to 5 minutes. We'll monitor this.

We'll be working—restricting members' questions time to 5 minutes so that we can afford as many people the opportunity to question as possible since this is a joint effort.

I see that we have a quorum. I now recognize myself for opening remarks.

Pursuant to notice, we're holding a hearing today entitled "NATO 2030: A Celebration of Origins and an Eye Toward the Future."

Ten years ago on June 14th, in true testament to the power of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance, 10 days ago rather, all 30 allied nations met at the NATO Summit in Brussels and agreed to launch an ambitious set of initiatives meant to ensure the collective security of NATO members well into the 21st century.

Moreover, President Biden reaffirmed the United States' commitment to NATO principles and responsibilities, most notably, America's steadfast commitment to Article 5, that an attack on any member of our Trans-Atlantic Alliance is an attack on all and will be met with a collective response.

In anticipation of last week's summit, my colleague and current president of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Representative Connolly, and I decided to organize this hearing to echo support for trans-Atlantic security ideals, reflect on and reaffirm the NATO alliance, and examine the critical takeaways from this year's summit.

Before I continue with my opening statement, I'd like to offer my thanks to you and your staff, Representative, for jointly helping us to organize this hearing today, and I commend your tireless efforts to preserve and strengthen the alliance and I look forward to continuing our work together during Congress.

I also welcome all NATO Parliamentary Assembly members who joined us today, which will undoubtedly elevate our discussion.

One of the first hearings I held as chairman of the subcommittee, roughly, 2 years ago was on the importance of the NATO alliance as well as the opportunities and challenges that our alliances face.

Much has changed in that relatively short period of time. We have had a Presidential election, undergone a global pandemic, tackled important social issues globally, and much more.

But what has remained constant through all of this is the vital role of NATO in our collective security and prosperity.

Looking toward the future and to quote Secretary General Stoltenberg, NATO must ensure the alliance can face the challenges and threats of today and, importantly, tomorrow.

These new and emerging security concerns include increased acts of aggression from China, Russia, and other malign actors, as well as an increase in asymmetrical threats, including cyber-attacks, hybrid warfare, terrorism, and climate change.

With new and emerging threats from traditional and nontraditional sources, the Biden administration's renewed commitment to our trans-Atlantic alliances and the role of American leadership at NATO has never been more important than it is now.

America has a responsibility to assure our NATO allies that this institution has been and will continue to be a cornerstone of our security and defense policies. Our unbreakable and values-based coalition is the strategic advantage that we have over our adversaries.

But these new and emerging threats, in the words of former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, also mean that NATO, like all things that reach a certain age, needs a little refurbishment.

This means contemplating possible changes of NATO structure and strategic thinking, not only about how NATO should adapt to this landscape but also how the U.S. and other member States must work together to strengthen the alliance and increase their own contributions.

For these reasons, I strongly support Secretary General Stoltenberg's efforts to gather diverse and inclusive voices in developing his priorities for NATO 2030, and was heartened to see leaders of the Western alliance make clear at the most recent summit

that NATO is ready and equipped to tackle the security challenges facing the world today.

Now, to better understand the outcomes and decisions made during the summit and the role of Congress in it, my colleagues and I and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly have invited an incredibly experienced and knowledgeable high-level set of witnesses intimately familiar with NATO and the many challenges: former Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, former Deputy Secretary General Rose Gottemoeller, former U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Ivo Daalder, and co-chair of the NATO 2030 Reflection Group, Wess Mitchell.

As a former NATO—as former NATO leaders and trans-Atlantic security professionals, you’ve been intimately involved in the inner workings of the alliance. You champion its ideals and have sought to modernize its impact on global security.

Your testimony will help us better understand the long-standing impacts of decisions made by NATO member States to ensure long-lasting security for generations to come.

NATO, now in its 73d year, is most powerful and successful alliance in history and one that continues to provide security for approximately 1 billion people in Europe and North America today.

As Members of Congress, we continue to support the work you’ve contributed to preserving and strengthening in this critically important political military alliance, and I look forward to hearing your testimony today.

I now turn to Ranking Member Brian Fitzpatrick for his opening statement.

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Thank you, Chairman Keating. Thank you to our witnesses, to Chairman Connolly, to all those joining us from the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

And today, we have the opportunity to hear from individuals who have set the agenda for NATO to learn from their past decisions and discuss how to ensure NATO is stronger and better prepared for the future.

Earlier this month, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg revealed the NATO 2030 agenda to address some of the most pressing issues facing our trans-Atlantic partnership.

The summit in Brussels marked a critical juncture of future cooperation amongst our allies, recognizing ways to work together and how to address the looming threat of our two strategic competitors, China and Russia.

And as a founding member, the United States is fully committed to the NATO alliance and to the Article 5 collective defense guarantee.

First invoked after the 9/11 terror attacks, our NATO allies stood shoulder to shoulder with the United States, sacrificing greatly in solidarity, and as we look to the future, a similar solidarity must be held when realizing the commitment of the 2014 Wales Summit.

NATO members must resist calls to downgrade the burden sharing formulas of 2 percent of GDP on defense and 20 percent of annual defense spending going toward new equipment, research, and development.

Greater cooperation amongst our NATO allies is also critical to Euro-Atlantic security and shared prosperity, and, as recognized at

the Brussels Summit, China and Russia have leveraged their economic interests and hybrid tactics to subvert Western institutions.

The summit's final item identified China for the first time as posing systemic challenges to our alliance. The NATO allies agree that "China's coercive policies stand in contrast to the fundamental values enshrined in NATO's founding treaty," and that was a direct quote.

China's predatory investments in the critical infrastructure of our NATO allies should be thoroughly examined where there might—where they might impair military mobility, resilience, and readiness.

However, naming China as a threat is not enough. We need to assure the alliance, in coordination with EU, takes concrete actions to address the threat of the Communist Chinese Party and the threat they pose to Euro-Atlantic security.

This will require the Biden administration to rally our NATO allies, including those who might not see the CCP as a pressing concern, to convince them that we cannot protect our collective interests without confronting the CCP directly as a united front.

Russia has intensified its cyber and disinformation campaigns targeting NATO member States and partner States. They have interfered with the democratic processes, harbored cyber criminals, violated NATO airspace, and engaged in provocative military activities.

Most notably, Russia has a sustained campaign of hostile and illegal occupation of NATO partner nations. Today, it's our hope that our witnesses can discuss what actions must take place for NATO partner countries to advance in their pursuit of membership.

Earlier this month, NATO leaders reiterated a 2008 pledge that Georgia and Ukraine will receive a Membership Action Plan. Ukraine has endured 7 years of Russian-instigated hot war and illegal annexation of Crimea, relentless cyber, and provocative military buildups on their border and in the Black Sea.

The illegal occupation of territory in Ukraine by Russia cannot be a disqualifying factor in creating a membership action plan from NATO.

It is my hope today that we can learn from our witnesses on how NATO can confront future threats and find a more equitable share of responsibility in reaching these objectives.

While modernization will not be easy, it is a necessary step in the face of the challenges we face in the next decade. I look forward to the testimony.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. KEATING. I thank the ranking member.

I'll now turn to the chairman of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Representative Gerry Connolly, for his opening remarks.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you so much, Bill—Mr. Chairman, and thank you to Mr. Fitzpatrick, the ranking member.

This is the first time, I think, ever we have had a joint hearing jointly sponsored by the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the European Subcommittee, and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly delegation.

I think it's important to remember that the NATO delegation—the U.S. delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly is actually codified in law.

There are not a lot of inter-parliamentary groups that are codified in law, but ours is. It's authorized in law and the membership is specified in law.

I think it's also important to note that we have got a great panel and we have been working with that panel getting ready for the 2030 update of the strategic plan for NATO.

We have got a very vibrant U.S. delegation that is participating in NATO Parliamentary Assembly. We just received the secretary general a few weeks ago and hosted, with your participation.

Mr. Chairman, you know, a session with the secretary general, who, of course, is also the first and only secretary general to have been invited on a bipartisan basis to address a joint session of the U.S. Congress.

We're also pleased that Nancy Pelosi, the Speaker of the House, is a former member of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and is the only speaker in the history of NATO PA to have addressed the annual meeting of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly not once but twice, and she's very committed to our endeavors.

Last week, NATO heads of State in government met in Brussels to develop a consensus on critical challenges facing the alliance.

Together, allies reaffirmed NATO's core mission and values, set key priorities for the alliance, going forward, and detailed several new initiatives on resilience, emerging technologies, climate change, and other pressing issues.

The alliance is at a critical juncture. The world continues to emerge from this devastating pandemic. The international power distribution is shifting fundamentally and the shared values upon which the alliance was founded are under threat, both from external forces of autocracy and authoritarianism and, sadly, internal extremist elements that would undermine liberal Western democratic principles.

It is in this context that the alliance needs a renewed U.S. commitment to NATO, multilateral action against the myriad threats posed by China, and to take concrete steps to strengthen democratic institutions throughout the alliance and within the alliance.

I believe the alliance achieved two of the three goals at the summit but fell short on the critical issue of shared values.

After 4 years of an American administration engaged in self-defeating attacks on NATO, contemplations of withdrawal from the Washington treaty itself and a less than full embrace of Article 5, President Biden has used the Brussels Summit to signal to our allies and the world that America is back. Our allies and partners are already breathing a collective sigh of relief.

By all accounts, the United States helped marshal key summit deliverables on China, as Mr. Fitzpatrick just talked about. The summit communique went beyond the 2019 London declaration identifying China as presenting both challenges and opportunities and, instead, articulated a more sober assessment of the multifaceted and persistent challenges and threats posed by China.

Getting China on the political and military agenda is something I've recommended in NATO reports I've written, including a report

in 2019, “The Rise of China: Implications to Global and Euro-Atlantic Security.”

China has the world’s largest military, including the largest navy and what is soon to become the world’s largest economy. It is increasing its investments in military modernization, critical infrastructure abroad, and emerging technologies.

China is exporting its authoritarian model of governance while it’s doing all of that, which runs counter and directly challenges the core values of our alliance while crushing democratic movements in places like Hong Kong.

It is engaged in cyber espionage against NATO countries and domestic industries, and as NATO Secretary General has observed, China demands our attention not because the alliance seeks to move into the South China Sea, but because China is increasing its influence and expanding its activities in the Euro-Atlantic region.

It is far past time that NATO undergo a comprehensive evaluation of the threats posed by China to the Alliance. The decision at the summit to revise NATO’s Strategic Concept is an opportunity to do just that. The current concept adopted in 2010 does not even mention China.

Furthermore, it identifies Russia still as a potential strategic partner. Russia continues, forcibly and illegally, to occupy Crimea and portions of Eastern Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, and Putin’s military political apparatus actively seeks to undermine or disrupt democratic elections and institutions throughout our alliance and would-be partners and members of the alliance.

Where I believe the summit fell short and what the rewrite of the Strategic Concept in my view must address is the clear imperative to bolster democracy within the alliance and across the alliance.

And given the events of January 6th in our country, this is an issue the United States can approach with a healthy dose of humility. If it can happen here, it can happen elsewhere.

NATO success over the past 70 years is not only due to its military might and capabilities, but also the fact that it is an alliance underpinned by common democratic values.

Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty States they, member States, are determined to safeguard the freedom common heritage and civilization of their peoples founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.

As the global march of autocracy quickens, NATO must rededicate itself to shared democratic values in concrete ways. We must continue to insist the allies uphold the founding democratic principles of our treaty and charter, and consider support for democratic institutions as a condition for membership in the alliance.

To that end, one of the top priorities that we are promoting at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly is to reinforce those values, and the strongest weapon we possess effectively to counter Putin regime’s authoritarianism is a vibrant, robust, and immutable expression of the liberal democratic values that bind us: freedom of press, freedom of assembly, freedom to dissent, freedom of religion, and an unshakable commitment to the rule of law.

So we have argued that NATO should establish a center for democratic resilience within NATO itself with the purpose of help-

ing member States strengthen democratic institutions to serve as a resource, to establish best practices and benchmarking and to, frankly, provide consulting opportunities for existing NATO members and would-be NATO members.

And I'm very pleased that the NATO 2030 Reflection Group, headed by one of our witnesses today, Dr. Wess Mitchell, actually adopted a version of that recommendation in its report to the Secretary General.

I look forward, Mr. Chairman, to our deliberations today, and I'm so grateful for your partnership and that of Mr. Fitzpatrick, in collaborating with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in this first ever hybrid hearing, and I look forward to hearing our discussion.

Thank you so much.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. Working with Vice Chairman Turner is Representative Austin Scott. I now recognize Representative Scott for your opening statement.

Mr. SCOTT. Well, thank you, Mr. Chair.

And America is stronger than ever, our military is stronger than ever, and our NATO alliance is stronger than ever, and so I look forward to being able to meet with—in person again soon and, again, I look forward to the conversation here today.

I think that all of you have a lot of valuable information to share with us and I look forward to learning from your experiences.

As a member of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, I think this is a very important group, and when we talk about countering our adversaries, supporting our allies, reaching our mutual goals laid out in the NATO 2030 plan.

Today, we'll discuss and examine the future of NATO and ongoing efforts to further strengthen the partnership between North America and Europe and others who share our interests and our values.

This conversation couldn't come at a more appropriate time as our adversaries continue to develop new technologies and show aggressive behaviors that pose new challenges for NATO member States.

To address these challenges, proposals of NATO 2030 focuses keenly on making NATO stronger and helping to adapt to growing global competitions. From tackling terrorism and cyber threats to upholding rules-based international order, this plan looks at how we can continue to maintain stability in our respective regions while also countering our common adversaries.

Russia's multi-domain military buildup, more assertive posture, and provocative activities near NATO borders are just a few of Russia's aggressive actions making it the top threat to Euro-Atlantic security.

China is making investments in critical infrastructure across Europe from telecommunication networks, support facilities, and its military reach is also getting closer to the Euro-Atlantic region.

China's malign activities throughout the world have implications for NATO, our member nations, our allies, and those who share our values and our interest.

One example is their continued over fishing and illegal fishing off the coast of Africa. AFRICOM Commander General Townsend testified that illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing by the Chi-

nese Communist Party is the primary contributor to a growing food crisis that will further drive instability in West Africa.

If not curbed, I believe this will be an issue that will require more international assistance in the coming years.

There's also great concern with China's growing role in international money laundering throughout the world. This spring, SOUTHCOM Commander Adam Fowler told the House Armed Services Committee that our interagency partners in the United States pointed out that communist China's money laundering is the number-one underlying source for transnational criminal organizations.

Let that sink in for a minute. The Chinese Communist Party is aiding the activities of transnational criminal organizations, including the trafficking of humans, drugs, and weapons through money laundering.

This is an issue I hope we can raise more attention on and work together to combat in regions around the world. As we focus on countering China and Russia aggression and the expansion in the Arctic, there's also an urgent need to address cybersecurity and cyber defense threats posed by China and Russia.

As we saw just a few weeks ago, a cyber-attack can cripple the movement of vital goods while impacting the economy and disrupting daily lives. We saw that right here in America.

I know addressing cyber concerns is one of several key components of NATO 2030. I look forward to working with this group as well as in my role as member of the House Armed Services Committee to address the cyber threats that NATO member nations face.

I also want to, briefly, touch on the future investments for NATO. As we look at bolstering current programs and implementing new ones, there must also be a focus on continuing the financial support from all NATO allies.

I applaud those who have reached the 2 percent funding commitment to defense spending. I hope we can get more member States on track to meet this goal.

As I said in my initial statement, NATO is stronger than ever, the American military is stronger than ever, and America is stronger than ever. This commitment to the funding is key to our alliance.

A focus on joint funding by all NATO member nations is key to continuing investments in trainings and exercises, cyber defense and cutting-edge technologies, and capacity building for our partners.

I want to, again, thank the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and Subcommittee on Europe, Energy and the Environment and Cyber for hosting this joint hearing today.

I also want to, again, thank our witnesses for joining us. I look forward to being able to meet in person.

And, Mr. Chairman, I yield the remainder of my time.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Representative Scott.

I now move to our witnesses for their opening statements.

Mr. Anders Fogh Rasmussen is the founder and chairman of Rasmussen Global. He's formerly served as secretary general of NATO after being elected the Prime Minister of Denmark.

I'll now recognize Mr. Rasmussen for your opening statement.

STATEMENT OF ANDERS FOGH RASMUSSEN, FOUNDER & CHAIRMAN, RASMUSSEN GLOBAL, FORMER SECRETARY GENERAL, NATO, FORMER PRIME MINISTER OF DENMARK

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Thank you very much, Chair Keating, Ranking Member Fitzpatrick, Representatives Connolly and Scott. Thank you for your opening statements.

And I'm so sorry that I cannot be with you in person today. There is no substitute for people-to-people contacts to keep friendships alive, and in my personal case, to spend time with my American grandchildren, and for these reasons I look forward to the United States lifting travel restrictions from Europe.

Now, NATO has been a successful peace movement for nearly 75 years. This is because of true strength and capacity to adapt and determined American global leadership. Both are interconnected, and my view is that we are at a moment where both strengths must converge.

Why? Because in 2021, the free world's greatest strengths are being weaponized by autocrats and dictators. Open trade is leveraged to coerce and co-opt.

Free speech is abused to spread polarizing disinformation. Technological innovation intended for benign causes is turned to malign ends.

Today, threats to our freedom are complex, from the distant front lines of a battlefield to a foreign investment with a political aim to the phones we hold in our hand.

For NATO, this means adopting a more global and a more political role, and I will draw the committee to three areas that I would like to focus on.

First, the Indo-Pacific. NATO should broaden and deepen its network of democratic allies around the world with a focus on the Indo-Pacific. NATO may be an Atlantic alliance, but it includes Pacific allies. Where America strong, freedom is strong.

The same applies to the Pacific. NATO should support the development of the Indo-Pacific court, starting with a NATO court summit, and we should look to expand NATO's network of so-called enhanced opportunities partnerships with more Indo-Pacific nations.

Second, on political and economic resilience, the Atlantic Alliance must counter the inbuilt self-doubt of free societies. We should stand tall for freedom and this means countering economic coercion.

In my written evidence, I set out an idea for an economic Article 5.

And then third, the emerging tech challenge. The free world must win the race to develop emerging technology and to set global norms and standards. I fear our disunity could lead to China winning the race and setting these rules.

The U.S. Congress recently received commendations from the National Security Commission on artificial intelligence.

I highly recommend them and I propose that a similar exercise be conducted within the trans-Atlantic space. Without a collective understanding, NATO will lose the race for technological advantage.

So with those three ideas, I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rasmussen follows:]

NATO 2030: A Celebration of Origins and An Eye Toward the Future

Evidence submitted by: Anders Fogh Rasmussen to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Energy, the Environment and Cyber

Hearing date: June 24th 2021

NATO's strength is its adaptability to new geopolitical realities and emerging security challenges.

The world has changed significantly since NATO allies agreed the last Strategic Concept in 2010. At that time, Moscow was still being courted as a potential partner; threats were mostly kinetic with hybrid threats still primitive; the People's Republic of China was in a pre-Xi era; and the economic crisis was still at the forefront of our thinking. During the past decade we could not have predicted the scale and pace of change, which will only continue to accelerate in this decade.

NATO's challenge is to adapt once more to a world where autocrats seek to weaponize our freedoms, and security challenges are no longer confined by geography or the battlefield. This requires NATO to assume a more political and global role in the future, developing new tools and capabilities - while not losing sight of its more traditional roles, including the collective defence of its own territory.

Today our freedom is attacked by autocrats and dictators every day, but their attacks fall under the threshold of what would traditionally trigger a NATO Article 5 response. It is a tactic of salami-slicing away at our security and internal cohesion, so that we sleepwalk into the dependency or internal wrangles that our enemies relish.

Autocracies vs Democracies

The era of power competition has returned. Today's great geopolitical challenge is the world's emboldened autocracies. They deploy similar tactics: they seek to divide the free world, sow dissent within our societies, and coerce us to make our societies look more like theirs.

In essence, autocracies seek to exploit our own freedoms. Free speech and an open internet are used to disseminate false narratives that undermine the legitimacy of our democratic processes. Free and open markets are abused for economic coercion, or to facilitate the strategic corruption that sustains kleptocratic systems like Putin's Russia and Xi's People's Republic of China (PRC).

To this end, NATO and its Allies should strengthen three areas: 1) our alliances with like-minded partners around the world, 2) our political resilience, and 3) our economic resilience.

Strengthened Alliances around the world

NATO is an Atlantic Alliance which includes Pacific Allies. Especially the USA and Canada, but also a couple of European states have territory and direct interests in the Indo-Pacific region.

NATO has already begun the process of closer cooperation with like-minded allies in the region. For example, during my term as NATO Secretary General, we signed a partnership with Japan and relations have continued to blossom since. This should be expanded upon.

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or 'Quad' is a critical development aimed to create an "Asian Arc of Democracy." It is in NATO and the free world's interests to develop further this initiative, under US leadership in the Pacific. A NATO-Quad summit should be convened to discuss critical topics of mutual interest such as freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, China's growing hostility against Taiwan, and how we can further promote interoperability in our military systems.

NATO can grant like-minded countries Enhanced Opportunities Partnership status. This is a status awarded to countries like Ukraine, Sweden and Jordan, to increase collaboration and participation in joint operations without granting full membership and the Article 5 guarantee. To date Australia is NATO's only EOP country in the Indo-Pacific and other countries could benefit from this enhanced cooperation. Just as NATO works closely with non-members Sweden and Finland to promote security and freedom of navigation in the Arctic, it should work with Indo-Pacific allies to ensure the Indo-Pacific remains a zone of freedom, rules and reciprocity.

The Alliance should also strengthen and expand ties with what it calls, 'Partners around the globe', to build cooperation, improve interoperability, and support the security of democracies.

NATO must also walk the talk on its open door policy. Putin seeks to exercise a veto by fomenting low-level conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine. Georgia is ready to join the Alliance and should be given a solution that enables it to join without the Article 5 guarantee applying to those territories under enemy occupation – much like West Germany joined NATO with Article 5 applying only to the territory controlled by the West German government. Likewise, when Ukraine has completed sufficient reforms to be ready for a Membership Action Plan, we cannot let the Donbas conflict continue to hold it back. It's time to call Putin's bluff.

Political Resilience

Freedom House recently recorded the 15th consecutive year of decline in global freedom and democracy.

Our generation is the best connected ever – to each other and to those elected to serve us. Yet that lack of filter has facilitated autocrats to spread narratives that seek to delegitimize our democratic processes. The aim of such narratives is either to tap into a pre-existing bias that makes disenchanted individuals want to share or engage with the content, or to plant a seed of doubt so that citizens no longer trust anything they see or hear – whether that's information shared by US intelligence agencies, or evidence on the safety of vaccines.

The common lexicon and facts upon which we base democratic societies are being decayed. Here, our challenge is both to take steps that tackle the narratives, detect and close down the bot and other networks that are disseminating such information, and find ways to build a far more media literate society – able to fact check and discern sources ourselves.

Domestic politicians also need to question whether they sometimes borrow from the autocrats' playbook. Candidates should stand on the front line of defending the democracy they participate in.

Societal resilience is a rising challenge and NATO is seeking to step up its actions here. The NATO2030 experts group proposed establishing a Centre of Excellence for Democratic Resilience dedicated to providing support to individual Allies, upon their request, for strengthening societal resilience to resist interference from hostile external actors in the functioning of their democratic institutions and processes.

Economic Coercion

NATO's European Allies are not unfamiliar with the use of economic coercion by autocratic states. Moscow has used its gas supplies as a weapon to blackmail its neighbours for many years. But while the Kremlin invented the playbook, Beijing has mastered using economic coercion to silence its critics and impose its will on democracies.

As a lifelong free trader, it pains me to see our open markets turned into a vulnerability.

Following the Eurozone crisis, Beijing acquired a number of strategic assets, especially in the Mediterranean. We began to see how Beijing was also buying influence in 2017 when the Greek government blocked an EU statement at the UN criticising China's human rights record, only months after the acquisition of the Port of Piraeus by China's COSCO.

In recent months we have seen the coercion step up a gear. The list of companies that have changed their behaviour to avoid offending China is long and growing, from movie companies to hotel chains. Fast fashion companies have been subjected to boycotts because they question the use of forced labour in Xinjiang. Australian wine producers have been subjected to PRC tariffs after the Australian government criticised Beijing's human rights record.

NATO alone cannot solve this challenge. Businesses will also have to play a role. However, the PRC uses economic coercion because it works.

This is why I have proposed an economic Article 5. In my view this should be an initiative of President Biden's planned Summit for Democracy and therefore not confined to NATO Allies alone. However, the principle could be the same – that an economic attack on one would trigger a collective economic response including rallying to support the company or country under attack, launching a credit facility to cushion losses or re-direct supply chains. If economic coercion stops being a successful weapon, autocrats will stop using it.

Meanwhile, NATO should strengthen its own in-house geo-economic tools in order to carry out assessments of the PRC's weaponizing economic power or the impact of its economic coercion on Allies. NATO should be able to carry out reviews of the security implications of FDI in Allied critical infrastructure and high-tech and adjust our own defence planning accordingly. We need to better assess the impact of the defence industries of third countries outside NATO on Allies and their security.

Winning the race for emerging technology – and setting global rules

For once I agree with Putin who said of Artificial Intelligence, “Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.” It must be the world’s democracies.

For NATO this means revisiting the ‘other’ spending target. We hear much about the two percent GDP target. However, at NATO’s 2014 Wales Summit we also committed to spending 20 percent of defence budgets on new equipment and R&D. This is critical but it won’t be enough. Let’s raise the ambition.

In the UK, for instance, the recent spending announcements associated with the Integrated Review, have aligned the MOD to focus on future capabilities such as AI, Cyber capabilities and space. All Allies should work individually or collaboratively to develop new capabilities, especially in the cyber domain where our critical infrastructure continues to be harmed by what appear to be relatively unsophisticated attacks.

However, simply developing capabilities will not be sufficient. We must also find more common rules and standards for how we will develop technology that both meets future challenges and upholds our democratic principles.

One example is fully autonomous weapons systems (aka killer robots). They will present significant challenges around ethics (whether humans will be involved in life and death decisions), and the need to develop split-second decision-making. I believe ‘Robot Wars’ lower the potential cost of conflict for the aggressors, which is why I have advocated for global conventions to address these questions now.

These are questions that we should answer within the Alliance, but they also rely on a stronger industrial base which puts innovation and collaboration at its heart. Here we need far more cooperation across the Atlantic in developing new technologies, allow for a freer flow of data within a strong framework of protection, and creating a common approach to the building blocks of our tech and green revolutions: semi-conductors and Rare Earth Elements.

On this topic I direct the Committee to the US National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) whose final report sets out a number of recommendations that should be taken forward both by the US and NATO allies.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you.

Ms. Rose Gottemoeller is the Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne distinguished lecturer at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

Formerly, she served as deputy secretary general of NATO. I now recognize you for your opening statement.

Thank you for being here.

STATEMENT OF ROSE GOTTEMOELLER, FRANK E. AND ARTHUR W. PAYNE DISTINGUISHED LECTURER, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND COOPERATION, FREEMAN SPOGLI INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, FORMER DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL, NATO, FORMER UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Thank you, Chairman Keating, Ranking Member Fitzpatrick, Chairman Connolly, Representative Scott, members of the subcommittee, and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

It's a true honor to have the opportunity to testify to you today about the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO.

If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to summarize some key points in my oral testimony and have the rest of my written testimony placed in the record.

Is that acceptable?

Mr. KEATING. Without objection, yes.

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Thank you.

NATO has finally recognized that the politics of the world have changed, a view, clearly, evident during the Brussels Summit meeting on June 14th. This moment has taken some time to arrive.

NATO's political stance did not mirror the decisive action that it took to respond in a defensive military way to Russia's aggression in Ukraine in 2014.

The Alliance was saddled with a Strategic Concept that dated to 2010. It described the strategic environment in a way that was far from the reality. I quote, "Today, the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low," unquote.

This characterization was hugely at odds with the quick and efficient military steps that NATO was taking. But some allies shied away from reexamining the Strategic Concept. Too many NATO members had a different view of what the top security priority should be, and they feared that debating a new concept would be too divisive.

Emmanuel Macron, the president of France, called NATO out on this failing in November 2019 with his searing criticism that the Alliance was brain dead. Operationally capable, yes, but failing to see how the world was changing around it.

Allied leaders picked up on this challenge at their London meeting in December 2019 and launched the year-long study NATO 2030 to see if NATO could do better. Eminent experts from across

the Alliance did the work, and you'll hear from one of the two co-chairs today, Dr. Wess Mitchell.

I will not rehearse at length the recommendations of the 2030 study. However, I would like to highlight my enthusiasm for the fact that NATO is launching a process to develop a new Strategic Concept. It is high time.

The new concept, in my view, should enable NATO to be a more autonomous and effective Alliance, less dependent on American military power at a time when the United States is pivoting to the Indo-Pacific.

I must make a brief but heartfelt comment about the issue of burden sharing. It will not go away. I know that many NATO member States are going to be searching for savings in their defense budgets as they address the economic crisis growing out of the COVID-19 pandemic.

This process is natural at such a time, but I would strongly urge allies to stay the course with the 2014 Wales Defense Investment Pledge.

The reason is simple. Allies need to modernize. Some are deploying Warsaw Pact equipment that is 50 years old. If NATO is to maintain readiness and reliability, never mind buildup its capacity, judicious modernization of military equipment across the Alliance needs to occur.

This investment in the Allies' own defense is vital because the United States will continue its pivot to Asia. Strategic necessity continues to drive in that direction. Therefore, the NATO allies will need to do more on behalf of their own defense.

Finally, I would like to reflect on the concept of democratic resilience at NATO, a vital and continuing goal for the Alliance. Here, I would like to make three points.

First, from my own experience as deputy secretary general, I can attest that NATO leadership is determined to advance this goal and does so through deft private diplomacy.

All of the top leaders at the NATO headquarters, civilian and military, take advantage of their good working relationships to ensure that member States receive a constant and compelling message about the necessity of upholding NATO's foundational values as laid out in the Washington treaty.

Second, the NATO leadership also undertakes consistently and persistently what I call an inside out approach to working the issues of NATO. The Alliance consistently embraces democratic values and the rule of law in conducting its daily business.

An example of this is how NATO insists on the application of international humanitarian law targeting policy and so trains its personnel.

Third, NATO actively displays these values wherever it shows its public face. I recollect, for example, the Crisis Management Exercise 2018, CMX 1918, which was built on the principle of transparency.

Of course, the Russians received an open invitation to observe the exercise and they did attend.

These three examples lead me to a recommendation. I recommend that NATO should reaffirm its foundational values in the

context of the 2030 review and the process of redoing the Strategic Concept.

It is important that these values are front and center at this time and that NATO send a clear message about them.

Thank you for this opportunity to testify, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions and to our discussions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Gottemoeller follows:]

Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on
Europe, Energy, the Environment and Cyber
June 24, 2021

“NATO 2030: A Celebration of Origins and an Eye toward the Future”

Rose Gottemoeller
Payne Distinguished Lecturer, Freeman-Spogli Institute
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Stanford University
Former Deputy Secretary General of NATO

Chairman Keating, Ranking Member Fitzpatrick, Chairman Connolly, Vice Chairman Turner, members of the Subcommittee and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. It is a true honor to have the opportunity to testify to you today about the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO.

If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to summarize some key points in my oral testimony and have the rest of my written testimony placed on the record. Is that acceptable to you?

NATO's Response to New Challenges

NATO has finally recognized that the politics of the world have changed, a view clearly evident during the Brussels summit meeting on June 14. This moment has taken some time to arrive.

In 2014, the Alliance quickly took defensive steps to respond to the Kremlin's military aggression against Ukraine and seizure of Crimea. It readied itself for reinforcement and a forward presence in the Baltic States, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. Every single NATO member came forward with military forces, in case Russian action called for a rapid response.

I was always proud of those decisive early decisions, which were beginning to bear fruit when I arrived as Deputy Secretary General in the autumn of 2016. They were so at odds with what I had heard about NATO—that it was slow at urgent decision-making and could not get its act together in case of need.

Less than one year after I arrived, in July 2017, the battlegroups in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Poland were certified for action. Units from all over NATO, from Albania in the south to Norway in the north, were ready to fight together. Should Moscow have contemplated an attack, NATO in its entirety would have responded—a powerful deterrent to a potential aggressor.

But NATO's political stance did not mirror that decisive action. The Alliance was saddled with a strategic concept that dated to 2010. It described the strategic environment in a way that was far from the reality: “Today, the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low.”

This characterization was hugely at odds with the quick and efficient military steps that NATO was taking, but some allies shied away from reexamining the strategic concept. Too many NATO members had different views of what the top security priorities should be, and they feared that debating a new concept would be too divisive. So NATO continued to make efficient progress on the military front, but its political underpinnings were lagging.

Emmanuel Macron, the President of France, called NATO out on this failing in November 2019, with his searing criticism that the alliance was brain dead—operationally capable, yes, but failing to see how the world was changing around it. Macron argued forcefully that new challenges, even threats, were coming over the horizon and NATO would not be ready for them.

Allied leaders picked up this challenge at their London meeting in December 2019, launching a year-long study to see if NATO could do better. Eminent experts from across the alliance did the work. “NATO 2030,” the result, produced a number of recommendations addressed to the Secretary-General. They are a worthy response to Macron’s criticism. They conveyed that NATO should step decisively into the future. At their summit on July 14, allied leaders accepted many of the recommendations, indicating that they are ready to confront head-on the global challenges confronting them.

Front and center is the sharpened competitive environment, with the persistence of Russia as a military power poised to do mischief on NATO’s periphery. The rise of China is a new and powerful focus, not because NATO would relocate to the South China Sea, but because China is playing in the midst of Europe. It is, for example, buying up control of transport infrastructure that may hamper NATO’s freedom to operate. Going forward, NATO will have to keep a sharp eye on both Russia and China, remaining ready forcefully to defend its interests.

I do want to emphasize that NATO should also seek opportunities to work with both countries. The long-standing approach to Russia stands—to be clear-eyed about the need to deter and defend, but also to look for opportunities to engage. Where China is concerned, NATO should develop a political approach, focused in the Euro-Atlantic space but recognizing China’s new role in the world.

I will not rehearse at length the NATO 2030 recommendations that alliance leaders blessed on June 14. However, I would like to highlight my enthusiasm for the fact that NATO is launching a process to develop a new strategic concept. It is high time. The new concept, in my view, should enable NATO to be a more autonomous and effective alliance, less dependent on American military power at a time when the United States is pivoting to the Indo-Pacific. NATO should be more ready to stand up for itself in the world; likewise, it should be more ready to stand with the United States when needed.

NATO’s Adaptability

Now I would like to turn to what I consider to be the main advantage of the alliance, and that is its adaptability. I will do so by focusing on how NATO reacted, and adapted, to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The front page of the NATO website caught my eye a year ago, in May 2020. There, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg “welcomed the offers of the United Kingdom and the State of Qatar to provide airlift assets coordinated by NATO’s Euro Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) in support of the United Nations’ effort to fight the COVID 19 pandemic.”

Of course, I am very proud of the EADRCC and the role that they played respond to the pandemic: it was perhaps the quickest and most coherent response of any international

organization, with the exception of the World Health Organization (WHO), which has health as its primary responsibility.

My main point about this website entry, however, is that NATO was available and was called on early by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, or OCHA. The assistance that NATO provided with its member the UK and its partner the UAE, responded to a global appeal by the UN to airlift medical supplies to Africa, via hubs in Ethiopia, Ghana and South Africa.

This would not have happened even two or three years ago. The United Nations would not have asked, because it was wary about working with NATO, since many influential UN member states were still heavily critical of the roles the alliance played in certain international conflicts and crises—the Western Balkans in the 1990s, Libya in 2011 being examples.

The critical attitude has shifted in recent years, however, with extensive cooperation opening up not only with the UN, but also with the European Union, thanks to Joint Statements or Memoranda that SecGen Stoltenberg has signed with the UN and EU leaderships, and the hard work of many staff in NATO HQ.

The African Union is another example of an international organization that has been wary of NATO, because of the earlier involvement in Libya, but now is working with NATO to perfect its peacekeeping training. The AU and the UN both consider NATO to provide the “gold standard” in peacekeeping training, therefore the NATO “brand” is already established in the peacekeeping arena.

The performance of the EARDCC and the NATO Strategic Airlift capability based at Papa, in Hungary, are also steadily enhancing the NATO brand during the pandemic. Thus, I think that the combination of better institutional relationships and successful recent experience makes it possible for NATO to contribute significantly in the post-pandemic world.

If NATO works with the UN, EU and AU, that will be a major contribution, but we have also seen the World Bank interested in working with NATO in specific circumstances, such as the peace process in Afghanistan. I know that there are many “ifs” about that process, in fact many negative developments, but I only wanted to say that international institutions that will be providing aid and financial assistance to economies as the pandemic’s effects continue to unfold are also interested in cooperation with NATO.

These efforts cannot come, of course, at the cost of NATO’s primary missions to provide for deterrence and defense for all its member states, and to continue in the fight against terrorism. NATO’s three core tasks of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security will not go away. Therefore, work with these institutions should always complement these main NATO tasks. This will require some creative thinking inside the alliance, but I am sure the HQ will not get too creative. As you know, the allies are always alert to how the institution’s resources are being used, and heavily opposed to mission creep.

But I do believe that we can gain some dual advantage from NATO efforts, without necessarily running up costs. What NATO does to help its members and partners deal with disasters such as the pandemic builds resilience, and resilience is at the very heart of what the alliance must do to adapt to new military threats. When NATO provides an ally or partner with advice about addressing corrosive disinformation during a disaster, it is also bolstering military resilience, the ability to ensure that military propaganda does not impact a vital operation. We need to look for such two-for-one value wherever we can.

Thus, what NATO is doing to adapt to the pandemic and its aftermath can also contribute to what it needs to do to become a more capable and resilient military alliance. This adaptability and willingness to change is at the heart of NATO's success.

Burden-Sharing in NATO

I must here make a brief but heartfelt remark about the issue of burden-sharing: it will not go away. I know that many NATO member states are going to be searching for savings in their defense budgets as they address the economic crisis growing out of COVID-19. This process is natural at such a time, but I would strongly urge allies to stay the course with the Wales Investment Pledge.

The reason is simple: allies need to modernize. Some are still deploying Warsaw Pact equipment that is 50 years old. If NATO is to maintain readiness and reliability—never mind build up its capacity—judicious modernization of military equipment across the Alliance needs to occur.

This investment in the allies' own defense is vital, because the United States will continue its pivot to Asia. Strategic necessity continues to drive in that direction. Therefore, the NATO Allies will need to do more on behalf of their own defense.

Democratic Resilience at NATO

Finally, I would like to reflect on the concept of democratic resilience at NATO, a vital and continuing goal for the alliance. At their June 14 summit, NATO member states embraced a "Strengthened Resilience Commitment." In it, they emphasized that, "The foundation of our resilience lies in our shared commitment to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law." Thus, these values are at the heart of resilience in NATO, but how best to advance them? Here I would like to make three points:

First, from my own experience as Deputy Secretary General, I can attest that NATO leadership is determined to advance this goal, and does so through deft private diplomacy. The NATO Secretary General is especially skilled at reaching out privately to his counterparts, the NATO heads of state and government. All of the top leaders at NATO HQ, civilian and military, take advantage of the good working relationships that they maintain to ensure that member states receive a constant and compelling message about the necessity of upholding NATO's foundational values, democracy and the rule of law, as laid out in the Washington Treaty.

Second, the NATO leadership also undertakes, consistently and persistently, what I call an “inside-out” approach to working the issues at NATO. The alliance consistently embraces democratic values and the rule of law, whether in conducting its daily business, training or exercises. An example of this is how NATO insists on the application of international humanitarian law to targeting policy, and so trains its personnel. This approach to training translates into a group of senior military officers and soldiers from across the alliance who are schooled in basic democratic values.

Third, NATO actively displays these values whenever it shows its public face. I recollect, for example, the “Crisis Management Exercise 2018” (CMX 18), which was built on the principle of transparency. It was designed to show-case NATO’s openness, close working relationship with its member states—there was strong public support for the exercise in Norway, where it took place—and allied unity, with good cooperation from the smallest member to the largest. Of course, the Russians received an open invitation to observe the exercise, and they did attend.

These three examples lead me to two recommendations. First, I recommend that NATO should reaffirm its foundational values in the context of the NATO 2030 review and the process of redoing the strategic concept. It is important that these values are front and center at this time, and that NATO send a clear message about them.

Second, I recommend that NATO look for ways to expand resilience in this arena with the establishment of an institutional structure affiliated with NATO. In my view, this structure should be built around the Center of Excellence (COE) concept.

NATO has developed a dynamic network of COEs in recent years that are working on some of the most troubling issues with which the alliance is contending. They are the site of policy innovation in the alliance, and are increasingly being pushed to work together to join forces against the challenges that NATO faces—cyber-attacks, misinformation campaigns, the whole panoply of hybrid challenges. Indeed, the NATO-EU COE on hybrid threats has been cited as a model for developing cooperation with the European Union on democratic resilience. I believe that such a NATO-EU COE on democratic resilience would be the best way to bring innovation to bear on this important problem, and I note that Romania has already offered to host such a center.

Thank you for this opportunity to testify, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your questions and to our discussion.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you very much.

Ambassador Ivo Daalder is president of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. He formerly served as U.S. Ambassador to NATO. Ambassador, you're now recognized for your opening statement.

STATEMENT OF DR. IVO DAALDER, PRESIDENT, CHICAGO COUNCIL ON GLOBAL AFFAIRS, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO NATO

Dr. DAALDER. Thank you, Chairman Keating and Ranking Member Fitzpatrick, NATO PA President Connolly, and Representative Scott for the opportunity to testify before you and the members of the subcommittee and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

I have a written statement that, if you don't mind, I would like to put in the record, but I will briefly summarize some of its key points.

Mr. KEATING. Without objection, yes. Proceed.

Dr. DAALDER. This is an opportune time to hold a hearing on NATO. The Alliance faces pressing security challenges as well as the need to reaffirm the long-standing commitment to collective defense, both of which were challenged in recent years.

The Brussels Summit earlier this week—this month did much to address these challenges, and it enabled the president of the United States to come to its allies to renew the U.S. commitment to what he called the sacred obligation of collective defense.

In my written statement, I detail how NATO has become the most successful alliance in history, and doing so primarily by proving adaptable to changing circumstances, successfully moving from a cold war alliance for its first 40 years to an enlarged alliance in the 1990's to an operational alliance by 2010, and to a renewed collective defense alliance in the aftermath of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2014.

Now NATO needs to adapt once more to meet the new challenges of the current age. The Brussels Summit recognized this need when it adopted NATO 2030, a Trans-Atlantic Alliance for the Future.

It's a remarkable document, setting out a very ambitious agenda not only for reinforcing deterrence and defense to counter what Alliance leaders rightly described as the serious threat to Euro-Atlantic security from Russia, but also to meet the many new challenges that now confront NATO members.

And I want to focus on those and mention just three.

First, China. For the first time, NATO did recognize the security challenge posed by a rising China. Though it is geographically removed far from the North Atlantic area, NATO countries now understand that China's growing regional and global ambitions can no longer be ignored.

At the same time, while NATO has now recognized the rise of China, mentioning the challenge that poses is very different than agreeing on how to respond to that challenge. And here, I'm concerned that even on the particulars Alliance members do not seem yet to agree on the character and the extent of the security challenge that China poses to NATO.

The Brussels communique states, and I quote, "China's growing influence in international policies can present challenges we need to address together as an alliance." Can, not does.

NATO will have to agree on the extent to which China poses a direct security challenge and how that challenge should be met collectively. That includes the possibility of dialog and deeper cooperation with our partners in—our democratic partners in Asia that Secretary General Rasmussen talked to, but it will also need to include greater intelligence and information sharing, closer coordination of maritime and other military activities as China encroaches on the North Atlantic area, and contingency planning and exercises geared to the possibility of direct military confrontation.

Second, on cyber, NATO has taken important steps to address the growing cyber threat to its security, including recognizing as early as 2014 that a cyber-attack could trigger Article 5's collective defense commitment. It now extended that commitment in the—at its Brussels Summit.

And yet, the cyber domain continues to evolve in complex and dangerous ways, and in this domain, as is so often the case—in this domain the best defense may well be a good offense.

That has not yet been NATO's focus, but it needs to start doing so. While NATO has agreed that it could respond to a cyber-attack with other means, it will also need to develop the doctrine and capabilities to employ cyber offensively to enhance deterrence of such attacks.

Third, on Europe, and burden sharing, I just want to echo the comments that Rose Gottemoeller had before—made before. The Alliance is unbalanced. Seventy-five years after World War 2, the United States still carries a disproportionate share of the burden of the common defense.

Yes, Europeans have increased defense spending quite a bit over the past 7 years, but these increases do not come close to compensate for the precipitous decline in defense spending over the preceding 15 years and is still greater under investment in much-needed advanced capabilities.

NATO's success requires a greater balance between its members with Europe taking on an ever-increasing share of the overall burden and responsibility for ensuring security on the continent.

Most people who reach the ripe age of 72 are ready for retirement, but NATO is not. It still fulfills a fundamental purpose of uniting allies across the Atlantic in common defense and of common values.

NATO has faced challenges before. It has adapted and emerged stronger as a result, and I have no doubt it will do so once again.

Thank you for this opportunity to testify before you and I would be happy to answer your questions.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Daalder follows:]

Ambassador Ivo H. Daalder (Ret.)
President,
Chicago Council on Global Affairs

Testimony before a Joint Hearing of the

House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on
Europe, Energy, the Environment and Cyber
and the
NATO Parliamentary Assembly

June 24, 2021

**NATO 2030:
A Celebration of Origins and an Eye Toward the Future**

Chairman Keating, Ranking Member Fitzpatrick, NATO PA President Connelly, and NATO PA Vice Chairman Turner,

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you and the members of the subcommittee and assembly.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is the most successful military alliance in history. What accounts for this historic success? Two factors stand out. First, as an international organization, NATO has demonstrated remarkable political cohesion over the years. Part of the reason for this political cohesion is that the Alliance unites a group of countries with shared values and a commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. But it is also because the United States, its largest and most powerful member, has been willing to carry a disproportionate share of the burden for maintaining peace and security throughout the North Atlantic area. Allies, in turn, have regarded Alliance unity as critical to sustaining NATO and the U.S. commitment on which their security depends.

A second, and equally important factor accounting for NATO's success, especially after the Cold War ended more than thirty years ago, is the Alliance's remarkable capacity to adapt to changing circumstances. Indeed, as an institution founded at the onset of the Cold War with the explicit purpose of defending its members against Soviet communism, many assumed that NATO's utility would expire once the Soviet Union withdrew its military forces from Europe and Germany and Europe were reunited. But far from disintegrating, NATO survived, indeed prospered, in subsequent years, even as it adapted to new security realities.

Now, in its 73rd year, NATO again faces the need to adapt to changing security circumstances. This month's Brussels Summit recognized that need when Alliance leaders [adopted](#) "NATO 2030—A Transatlantic Agenda for the Future." That agenda is ambitious and will require significant adaptation and commitment on the part of all NATO members. However, if history is any guide, the Alliance will likely succeed in its adaptation.

An Adaptable Alliance

NATO has proven to be a remarkably adaptable organization, changing its ways as circumstances warranted even as it retained its essential character as an alliance of democracies committed to defend their common interests, security, and values through cooperative action. Indeed, with NATO 2030, the Atlantic Alliance is undergoing its fifth major transformation in 70+ years.

- **NATO 1.0.** The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 emerged from a demand of European countries for the United States to help defend the continent, or at least its western half, against the surging Soviet political and military threat from the East. Washington acceded to the request, signing on to a treaty commitment that, at its core, intertwined Europe's security with that of the United States and Canada. The organization evolved

over the subsequent 40 years, both as an integrated military bulwark to thwart Soviet ambitions in Europe and as the political foundation for foreign and security policy on both sides of the Atlantic. Its overall success was attested by the fact that the Cold War ended on western terms—with the unification of Germany, the end of the Warsaw Pact, and the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union itself.

- **NATO 2.0.** Rather than wither away after the Cold War, NATO found new purpose in trying to achieve for central and eastern Europe what it had so successfully helped to accomplish for western Europe—a continent where all countries enjoyed the freedom and prosperity that only liberal democracies could provide. NATO, followed by the European Union, opened its membership to welcome into the Alliance those European countries that had been caught behind the Iron Curtain and were now willing and able to embrace liberal democracy and a market-based economy as their own future. Indeed, it was the prospect of joining the western club of democracies and their defensive alliance that provided the necessary incentive to these countries to change and adopt the characteristics that had made their western European cousins so successful. The result was the creation of a Europe that was more united, more free, and more peaceful than in any time in history.
- **NATO 3.0.** Even as NATO enlarged (bringing in first three, then seven, and finally another four members) it already took steps for a third adaptation—this time into becoming a more operational alliance. NATO's first foray into actual military operations started in the Balkans, with air campaigns to end fighting in Bosnia and Kosovo, followed by large-scale, multinational peace enforcement operations. By the first decade of the new century, NATO had embarked on a host of military operations. The largest of these was the mission in Afghanistan, which at one point encompassed more than 150,000 troops from almost 50 countries operating under a unified NATO command. Others included an anti-terrorism maritime operation in the Mediterranean Sea, an anti-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia, an air policing operation over the Baltics, peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, and a UN enforcement operation in Libya. Where once NATO's focus had been deterrence, by 2011 the Alliance deployed more than 200,000 troops in no less than six simultaneous operations, in three continents, including some as far away as 7,000 km from NATO's headquarters in Brussels.
- **NATO 4.0.** The Russian invasion of Ukraine, including its illegal annexation of Crimea and its continued, direct support for separatist forces in eastern Ukraine, forced NATO to adapt once more—this time by returning to first principles. Whereas NATO, in its 2010 Strategic Concept, had given equal weight to its three core tasks (collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security), the first of these now needed renewed emphasis. And that's what NATO did. Members committed to reverse cuts in defense spending, adapt their military postures, and bolster deterrence, notably in the East. The Alliance adopted a Readiness Action Plan that provided for increased readiness of the NATO Response Force, the deployment of NATO troops on a continuous basis in the Baltic states, Poland, and elsewhere in eastern Europe, the creation of a rapid reaction

force capable of deploying 30 battalions, 30 squadrons, and 30 naval vessels in 30 days, new command headquarters to oversee the new deployments, and other reinforcement measures. NATO, in short, was back to focusing on deterrence and defense of its members' territory, sovereignty, and independence.

NATO 2030

Today, NATO again faces change in the security environment, which will require the Alliance to be adapted once more. Alliance leaders recognized this need at their Summit earlier this month in Brussels. There, they agreed on a new transatlantic agenda for NATO 2030 (or NATO 5.0), which will build on the prior military and political adaptations, further strengthen its ability to execute the Alliance's three core tasks, and make the Alliance ready to meet all future challenges.

Three major factors drive the NATO 2030 agenda and the Alliance's further adaptation:

- **China.** For the first time, NATO recognized the security challenge posed by a rising China. Though geographically far removed from the North Atlantic area, NATO countries understand that China's growing regional and global ambitions can no longer be ignored. China is in Europe, not only as an economic actor, but increasingly as a country that carries strategic weight. Its naval forces have conducted joint exercises in the Mediterranean, its expanding naval base in Djibouti gives Beijing growing strategic reach into Europe, and its rapidly advancing interest in the Arctic is of increasing concern to NATO countries in the region. Its defense investments are second only to those of the United States, and its nuclear, missile, and power projection capabilities are rapidly expanding. Even if China isn't (yet) a direct security threat to NATO countries, the Alliance can no longer afford to ignore its rise and the challenge China presents as a systemic rival and security risk.
- **Cyber.** For more than a decade, NATO has recognized the danger of cyber threats to the security of its members and adapted its cyber defenses accordingly. Today, however, "cyber threats to the security of the Alliance are complex, destructive, coercive, and becoming ever more frequent," as the [Brussels communiqué](#) put it. The increasing sophistication and destructiveness of cyber mean that NATO now must be prepared not only to defend such attacks, but to actively deter and counter the entire spectrum of cyber threats, including by recognizing the possibility that an attack can amount to an armed attack necessitating the invocation of Article 5. "If necessary, we will impose costs on those who harm us," Alliance leaders have now agreed. "Our response need not be restricted to the cyber domain." These are important statements that aim to strengthen deterrence against such attacks.
- **Climate.** The largest and most far-reaching threat facing NATO and, indeed, all countries in the world, is the growing climate crisis. Already today warming global temperatures are responsible for massive disruptions in local climate conditions—from historic droughts to more intense hurricanes and storms to unprecedented floods to rapidly

melting ice caps on the earth's poles. NATO has long recognized the danger of the climate crisis but has left it to the individual members and other international organizations to respond. Until now. At the Brussels Summit, leaders agreed that NATO needs to aim to become "the leading international organization when it comes to understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change on security." This represents a bold, and ambitious, entry into the international field of fighting the climate crisis.

NATO leaders tasked the Secretary General to lead the effort to draft a new Strategic Concept for their approval next year. That is a tall order, for the new concept will need to take account of the many changes that have propelled the Alliance's adaptation since 2010, which was when they agreed the current Strategic Concept.

Key Issues

Alliance leaders recognized in Brussels that the "NATO 2030 agenda sets a higher level of ambition for NATO." And so it does. But will the Alliance meet that new level of ambition? The answer depends on how NATO Allies will address and agree on a host of complicated issues—including how to effectively counter the threat from Russia, whether and when to enlarge its membership, where and how it sees itself operating militarily post-Afghanistan, how to adapt to and incorporate advanced technologies such as AI and robotics into their military forces, and so much more. Ultimate success, however, will depend on how NATO addresses three critical issues: China, cyber, and resources.

- **China.** While recognizing that NATO for the first time noted the rise of China as a concern for the Alliance, mentioning the challenge it poses is very different from agreeing on how to respond to that challenge. Even on the particulars, Alliance members do not all agree on the character and extent of the security challenge China to NATO. The Brussels communiqué states that "China's growing influence and international policies *can* present challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance"—*can*, not *does*—though later the leaders agree that "China's stated ambitions and assertive behavior present systemic challenges." NATO will have to agree on the extent to which China poses a direct security challenge and how that challenge should be met collectively. That includes the possibility of dialogue and deeper cooperation and partnership with democratic allies in Asia. But it will also need to include greater intelligence and information sharing, closer coordination of maritime and other military activities as China encroaches on the North Atlantic area, and contingency planning and exercises geared to prepare for a possible conflict. It is not clear that all NATO countries are yet willing to undertake any, let alone, all these measures.
- **Cyber.** NATO has taken important steps to address the growing cyber threat to its security, including recognizing as early as 2014 that a cyberattack could trigger Article 5's collective defense commitment—and it extended these commitments in Brussels. It has also done much over the years to strengthen cyber defenses, including the ability to assist allies subject to attack. Yet, the cyber domain continues to evolve in complex and

dangerous ways, and in this domain, it is often the case that the best defense is a good offense. President Biden, in his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and afterwards to the world's press, [noted](#) that the United States has significant cyber capabilities and, if attacked “will respond in a cyber way.” While NATO has now agreed that it could respond to a cyberattack with other means, it will also need to develop the doctrine and capabilities to employ cyber capabilities offensively to enhance deterrence of such attacks. Though NATO cyber thinking and policy has evolved quite a bit in recent years, it is not clear that the Alliance can agree on this next, critical step to address the rising cyber threat.

- **Resources.** Finally, it comes down to money. Burden sharing has been a perennial issue for the Alliance—ever since President Truman castigated the European Allies for not deploying enough divisions to defend NATO against possible Soviet attack. Congress has been regularly involved in mandating increasing resources from the Allies, from the Nunn amendments in the 1970s to more recent calls to abide by the 2% commitment. Presidents have repeatedly warned Allies that failure to meet commitments could undermine political backing for U.S. troop deployments in Europe. The need continues today. Yes, NATO countries other than the United States have increased defense spending quite a bit over the past seven years—\$260 billion overall. Yet, these increases do not come close to compensate for the precipitous decline in defense spending over the preceding 15 years or the still greater under-investment in much-needed advanced capabilities. The success of NATO requires a greater degree of balance—with Europe taking on an ever-increasing share of the overall burden and responsibility for ensuring security of the continent. That need is less about the overall percentage of spending, than it is about devoting the resources that are necessary to meet the increasing security challenges that NATO now faces. Will European and Canadian Allies step up?

NATO's Success

Most people who reach the ripe age of 72 are ready for retirement. But NATO isn't. It still fulfills a fundamental purpose of uniting allies across the Atlantic in common defense of common values and territory. NATO has faced its challenges before—and always adapted, emerging stronger as a result.

It has just weathered one of its gravest crises in its history—as its leading member sought to call the very value of the Alliance into question. The Brussels Summit demonstrated America's enduring commitment to common security and collective defense, through NATO. Now, it needs to continue what it has done so successfully in the past: continue to adapt to the new challenges that have emerged.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Ambassador.

Dr. Wess Mitchell is the co-chair of the NATO 2030 Reflection Group and formerly served as assistant secretary of State for European and Eurasian affairs at the U.S. Department of State after co-founding the Center for European Policy Analysis.

I will now recognize Dr. Mitchell for your opening statements.

STATEMENT OF DR. A. WESS MITCHELL, CO-CHAIR, NATO 2030 REFLECTION GROUP, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Dr. MITCHELL. Well, thank you, Chair Keating, Ranking Member Fitzpatrick, Chair Connolly, and Representative Scott for the opportunity to testify today.

I will submit a written testimony, like my colleagues, for the record and summarize that testimony and my comments today, if that is acceptable to the chair.

Mr. KEATING. Yes, proceed.

Dr. MITCHELL. NATO must adapt for a new era of great power competition. That is the message that a high-level group of experts, which I had the honor to co-chair, recently delivered to Secretary General Stoltenberg.

The changes needed at NATO are serious yet feasible. But the hour is late and the opponents of the West are gaining in strength. The costs of failure would be high.

What makes NATO's adaptation so urgent is the scale of change that is underway in the international balance of power.

By 2030, China's GDP is projected to be greater than that of the United States and European Union combined. Russia remains a vengeful actor with a modernized conventional military and one of the world's largest nuclear arsenals.

Both China and Russia are led by despotic regimes that seek to undermine the democratic political order of the American republic and our allies. The main task facing NATO is to consolidate the Atlantic Alliance for an era of strategic simultaneity, in the words of our report, an era in which the West will face concurrent pressure from two large State actors in opposite directions from the Euro-Atlantic area.

This new environment presents two chief dangers, one political and one military. The political danger is that China and Russia will use their size and power to divide, isolate, and manipulate American allies.

China enjoys an enormous power disparity vis-a-vis individual Western States. Russia has a well-practiced repertoire of tools with which to cow smaller States. The danger is that our rivals will suddenly deliquesce the bond between the United States and its allies, rendering NATO less cohesive even as it continues to exist in name.

The military danger is that China and Russia will generate simultaneous crises that strain or exceed our capacity to handle. Under the 2018 National Defense Strategy, the United States replaced the two-war standard with an emphasis on fighting one war with China in conditions in which it is unlikely to possess escalation dominance.

This means that more and more U.S. military resources will go to the Indo-Pacific and that the United States will prioritize developing capabilities for Asian maritime rather than European land combat environments.

These two dangers provide a baseline for how the United States should think about NATO's role.

First, NATO needs a strategy that matches the world of the next decade. Last week, NATO leaders agreed to our report's recommendation to update the Strategic Concept.

The United States should use this process to bring NATO into alignment with U.S. global strategic requirements by enhancing European allies' conventional deterrence vis-a-vis Russia, and affirming NATO's role in dealing with those aspects of Chinese behavior that affect Euro-Atlantic security.

Second, NATO needs better tools to deal with a challenge from China. While it is inadvisable to push NATO to play a military role in Asia, it is in our interest and squarely within the remit of NATO's mandate for it to address Chinese activities that impact military readiness, interoperability, and secure communication in SACEUR's area of responsibility.

Third, the United States must redouble efforts to improve burden sharing. It is reasonable to expect Europeans to field at least 50 percent of the conventional capabilities and enablers for securing the European theater to free up U.S. forces to focus on the Indo-Pacific region in the event of a major crisis.

Fourth, NATO will need greater political cohesion to meet the growing threats from China and Russia. Efforts at European strategic autonomy should be welcomed insofar as they aid in meeting established NATO capability targets but firmly resisted insofar as they deepen the bifurcation of the West into competing blocks.

But the threats to Western cohesion are not only or primarily institutional. As articulated in the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO exists to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of its peoples founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and rule of law.

NATO should develop a center for democratic resilience to resist foreign influence in allied public institutions, and it should address head on the tendency of some allies to politicize NATO decision-making in ways that benefit its rivals.

It is in the American interest to preserve and strengthen NATO. Even as the United States shifts focus to the Pacific, the Trans-Atlantic Alliance remains the seat of the free West and the foundation of American strength in the world.

We have a window of opportunity to make the needed changes. If NATO seizes this opportunity, I'm confident the Trans-Atlantic Alliance can deal with the profound challenges it faces in the coming decade.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Mitchell follows:]

Written Testimony submitted to
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U.S. House of Representatives
24 June 2021

Dr. A. Wess Mitchell
Co-Chair, NATO 2030 Reflection Group

Adapting NATO for an Era of Great Power Competition

Thank you Chair Keating, Ranking Member Fitzpatrick, Chair Connolly, and Vice Chair Turner for the opportunity to testify today.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) must fundamentally reorient and adapt for a new era of great-power competition. That is the main message that a high-level group of experts from both sides of the Atlantic, which I co-chaired, recently delivered to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg.¹ The group's report was the result of seven months of consultation with all thirty NATO capitals, most of NATO's 26 partner states, and leading military officials and experts from North America and Europe. It contained 138 recommendations for reform in NATO's strategic, political and administrative functions, many of which were adopted by the North Atlantic Council at the June 2021 NATO Leaders Meeting.

The changes needed at NATO are serious but feasible. They include a fundamental reappraisal of NATO's priorities and update to its Strategic Concept, including to deal with the challenge from China; a more equitable distribution of burdens among NATO's members to support a refocusing of U.S. military resources to the Western Pacific; and better tools for dealing with politically-motivated blockages, deconflicting activities with the European Union (EU), and making quicker decisions in a crisis.

NATO is capable of making these changes; indeed, its history is one of successful strategic adaptation in the face of geopolitical change. But the hour is late, the opponents of the West are gaining in strength, and the obstacles to reform are real. The costs of failure would be high.

¹ "NATO 2030: United for a New Era; Analysis and Recommendations of the Reflection Group Appointed by the NATO Secretary General," *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, November 2020, (https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf).

What makes NATO's adaptation so urgent is the scale and pace of change that is underway in the international balance of power. The leitmotif of global geopolitics in the coming decade will be intensifying rivalry between the world's largest states, especially between the United States and the People's Republic of China. By 2030, China's GDP is projected to be greater than that of the United States and EU combined. China's defense budget has doubled over the last decade and that country has already surpassed the United States in naval shipbuilding, land-based conventional ballistic and cruise missiles, and integrated air-defense systems.² At the same time, the Russian Federation remains a powerful and vengeful military actor with modernized conventional forces and one of the world's two largest nuclear arsenals. Both China and Russia are led by despotic regimes that seek to undermine the democratic political order of the American republic and its allies.

In these circumstances, the main task facing NATO is, as outlined by the Reflection Group's report, to "consolidate the Atlantic Alliance for an era of strategic simultaneity," in which the countries of the West will face concurrent military, political and economic pressure from two large state actors in opposite directions from the Euro-Atlantic area.³

This new environment presents two chief dangers, one political and one military.

The political danger is that China and Russia will use their size and power to divide, isolate and manipulate American allies. China in particular enjoys an enormous disparity in wealth and power vis-à-vis individual Western states. Russia has a well-practiced repertoire of cyber, energy and military tools with which to cow smaller states. The danger for the United States is that its rivals will use these techniques to subtly deliquesce the bonds between it and its allies, rendering NATO less cohesive and therefore less effective, even as it continues to exist in name.

The military danger is that the China and Russia will present the United States and its allies with simultaneous military crises at opposite ends of Eurasia that strain or exceed our military capacity to handle. Under the 2018 National Defense Strategy, the United States replaced its previous two-war standard, which was designed to ensure the ability to fight two (smaller) opponents simultaneously, with an emphasis on fighting and winning a war with its strongest adversary, China, in conditions in which it is unlikely to possess escalation dominance. Consequently, for the foreseeable future

² "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China," Annual Report to Congress, *Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense*, 2020, (<https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF>).

³ For more on strategic simultaneity, see A. Wess Mitchell, "A Strategy for Avoiding Two-Front War," *The National Interest*, July/August 2021, forthcoming.

Europe is likely to be the secondary theater from a U.S. military-strategic perspective. In practical terms, this means that more and more U.S. military resources and attention will go to the Indo-Pacific and that the United States will prioritize developing capabilities for Asian/maritime rather than European/land combat environments.⁴

These two dangers provide a baseline for how the United States should think about NATO's role. The absence of a peer competitor in the immediate post-Cold War period enabled the United States to largely assume the cohesion of the West and think of NATO primarily as a tool for projecting stability to outside regions—first the Balkans and, after the September 11th attacks, to places further afield like Afghanistan. With the return of great power competition, when we are confronted by two large, determined, and capable state actors, U.S. attention must shift to consolidation of the Western strategic core itself to provide the broadest possible political, demographic and commercial base from which to engage in protracted competition with China and Russia. NATO has an indispensable role to play both politically, in cementing the United States to its closest allies in Europe, and militarily, in providing a secure foundation from which we can devote attention to Indo-Pacific without calling into question the stability of the European theater.

What will this require of NATO?

First, NATO needs a strategy that matches the world of the next decade and, in particular, that equips the West to grapple with the reality of strategic simultaneity. The current NATO Strategic Concept was written in 2010. It reflects the assumptions of a permissive rather than contested strategic environment and the preoccupations which that lenient environment afforded: out-of-area operations against non-peer foes and crisis management rather than strategic anticipation. Last week NATO leaders agreed to our report's recommendation to update the Strategic Concept. The United States should use this updating process to bring NATO into better alignment with U.S. global strategic requirements, particularly by enhancing European allies' contributions to the conventional deterrence burden vis-à-vis Russia and affirming NATO's role in dealing with those aspects of Chinese behavior that affect the security of the Euro-Atlantic area.

Second, NATO needs better tools to deal with the challenge from China. Last week's Leaders Meeting acknowledged the scale of China's ambitious and assertive behavior

⁴ See Elbridge A. Colby, "Implementation of the National Defense Strategy," *Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee*, 29 January 2019, (https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Colby_01-29-19.pdf), and Jim Mitre, "A Eulogy for the Two-War Construct," *Washington Quarterly* 41:4, (2018): pp. 7-30.

and agreed that NATO has a role to play in addressing these issues. But much more needs to be done. While it is inadvisable to push NATO to play a military role in Asia, it is in our interest, and squarely within the remit of NATO's mandate, for it to address Chinese activities that have an impact on military readiness, interoperability and secure communication in SACEUR's Area of Responsibility. As outlined in our report, NATO needs a consultative body to coordinate allied security policy on China, a North Atlantic equivalent of DARPA to spur allied cooperation in emerging technologies, stiffer barriers to allied military-technological ties with China, and increased cooperation with Asian partners, including India.

Third, the United States must redouble efforts to improve burden-sharing on the part of NATO allies. This is not only a matter of political fairness and good stewardship for U.S. taxpayers; it is first and foremost a strategic necessity, fulfilment of which is intimately tied to America's ability to manage the problem of strategic simultaneity and ensure the concurrent stability of the Western Pacific and Europe. As such, the United States must resist any effort to define downward the burden-sharing formulas agreed upon at the 2014 Wales Summit. While the United States will continue to provide the majority of strategic enablers for NATO for the foreseeable future, it is reasonable to expect Europeans to field at least fifty percent of the conventional capabilities and enablers for securing the European theater to free up U.S. forces to focus on the Indo-Pacific region in the event of a major crisis.⁵

Fourth and finally, NATO will need greater political cohesion to meet the growing threats from China and Russia. In an era of great-power competition, as I have argued today, the first object of U.S. statecraft must be the strategic, political and economic consolidation of the Western Alliance. Efforts at European "strategic autonomy" should be welcomed insofar as they avoid duplication of NATO and aid in meeting established NATO capability targets – but firmly resisted insofar as they involve initiatives that would deepen the bifurcation of the West into competing blocs.

But the threats to Western cohesion are not only or even primarily institutional. As articulated in the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO exists to 'safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of [its] peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.' NATO needs better tools to deal with the problem of allied capitals entering into deep political relationships with the very authoritarian rivals it exists to defend them against. As outlined in our report, NATO should develop a Center for Democratic Resilience to aid allies in resisting

⁵ This would correspond to maintaining the capabilities for fulfilling half (1+3) of the 2+6 responsibilities (two major operations plus six smaller ones) under NATO's agreed-upon Level of Ambition formula. See Heinrich Brauss and Christian Mölling, "NATO 2030 – The Military Dimension," *NDC Policy Brief*, No. 07, April 2021, (<https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1551>).

hostile foreign influence in their public institutions. It should institute the recommendation of the 1956 Wise Men report to conduct an annual review of the internal political health and development of NATO. And it should address head-on the growing tendency of some allies to politicize NATO decision-making in ways that benefit NATO's rivals, including the use of single-country blockages that import extraneous bilateral disputes into the North Atlantic Council.

It is in America's vital interest to preserve and strengthen NATO. Even as the United States shifts more and more military focus to the Western Pacific, the transatlantic Alliance remains the seat of the free West and the foundation of America's political and economic strength in the world. Preserving this alliance will require NATO to adapt to a strategic landscape that is much more competitive than the greenhouse-like conditions it has known since the end of the Cold War. We have a window of opportunity to make the needed changes. NATO needs to seize it. If it does, I am confident the transatlantic Alliance can deal with the profound challenges it faces in the coming decade.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Doctor, and I'd like to thank all the witnesses for your testimony. And without objection, the prepared statements of all the witnesses will be made part of the record.

I'll now recognize members for 5 minutes each, and pursuant to House rules, all time yielded is for the purposes of questioning our witnesses.

Because of the virtual format of the hearing, I'll recognize members by committee seniority alternating between Democrats and Republicans and between members of the European Subcommittee and of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

If you miss your turn, please let our staff know and we'll circle back to you. If you seek recognition, you must unmute your microphone and address the chair verbally. I'll now recognize myself for 5 minutes.

NATO continues to work with emerging and developing democracies in line with NATO values. To expand NATO membership through NATO Member Action Plans is essential and currently only Bosnia is the only aspirant that has a NATO Member Action Plan.

To any of our witnesses, during the recent visit to Washington, Secretary General Stoltenberg stated that there's no concrete plans to expand NATO in the short term. But he also indicated in his statements that there ways that NATO can assist countries aspiring to join the alliance in this interim period. There are things that can be done.

Can you—can any of our witnesses speak to what specific actions NATO can take in this regard, what they would suggest? It's an important issue. I throw the question to any of our witnesses.

Mr. Rasmussen.

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Thank you very much.

First of all, let me draw your attention also to my written testimony that has been submitted to the committee. It seems that my co-witnesses are more experienced in meeting before your committees and they asked explicitly for permission to include their written statements in your records of the hearing and the committee. And if you don't object to that, I would know be pleased—

Mr. KEATING. No, I'd already done that. Just go ahead and proceed.

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Thank you.

To your concrete questions, I think time has come to grant a so-called membership action plan to Georgia and Ukraine. Both countries fulfill the criteria for receiving such a membership action plan. It is not a guarantee for future membership, but it is a step in the right direction.

It would be to followup positively on the decision we took at the NATO Summit in Bucharest in 2008. But at that time, we could not agree on a membership action plan. But we decided that next steps should be a membership action plan.

I think it will send an important signal to Russia. It will also send an important signal to the domestic audience in Georgia and Ukraine and encourage them to continue reforms.

So, in conclusion, I think time has come to grant the two countries a membership action plan.

Mr. KEATING. Yes, Dr. Mitchell?

Dr. MITCHELL. Let me just add to that, that in the reflection process, it became very apparent to me that NATO urgently needs to reform the way that its partnerships function, and I'll just give you two examples of things that could be addressed in those reforms.

One, and this surprises even a lot of longtime observers of NATO is the way partnerships are funded. They are funded on a voluntary basis. They're not—there's not a regular, predictable funding flow for partnership activities and I think that limits our ability to make strategic use of these tools.

And second, the frequency with which a handful of allies, and I'm thinking of two in particular, politicize partnership activities and introduce single-country blockages to prevent them from functioning.

This has happened repeatedly to Ukraine. It happens to Israel. It happens to Austria. And I think there are real-world and attainable reforms that NATO could take on that would make the partnership activities that it has now a lot more serviceable.

Mr. KEATING. Great. Yes. Ms. Gottemoeller, I also want to see what interim steps perhaps the countries could pursue themselves as well. Yes, Ms. Gottemoeller?

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Yes, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I certainly endorse what Mr. Mitchell just had to say.

I really found that maddening while I was deputy secretary general that it was impossible in some cases to move forward on partnerships because of blockages put in place by individual member States.

But I did want to focus attention on the fact that not only does a NATO engage in military training and development of capacity building in these States, but also works on tackling the problem of corruption in these States.

And I wanted to endorse the role of our NATO offices in these States in being able to establish good working relationships throughout the governments there and to really in that way, again, work from the inside out to try to ensure that the corruption that dogs these countries and really stands in the way of their NATO membership is dealt with over time.

I know this is a goal for individual countries like the U.S. as well, but in this case very important. Thank you, sir.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you so much. My time has expired.

I'll now recognize Ranking Member Fitzpatrick for 5 minutes.

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My question is for Mr. Mitchell.

Recently, heightened tensions between some allies and NATO member Turkey have prompted questions of standards for NATO membership.

Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg criticized Turkey's acquisition of the S-400 air defense system from Russia, stating that it can pose a risk to our aircraft and then that the system cannot be integrated into NATO's air and missile defense system.

Briefly, sir, can you describe how does Turkey's acquisition of the Russian S-400 negatively impact the NATO alliance?

Dr. MITCHELL. Well, thank you, Representative Fitzpatrick, for that very important question.

I think there is a problem, and I'm speaking for myself here and not in my capacity as the co-chair of the Reflection Group. There's no question that Turkey's acquisition of a sophisticated Russian air defense system has implications for NATO politically.

I think technologically some of the risks to our own military technologies are well known. I think it affects interoperability.

And I think there's also no question that there have been significant political tensions between Turkey and other NATO members. I'm thinking of Greece and the non-NATO State, Cyprus, that played out as a sort of leitmotif as our—as our group was conducting its deliberations.

And I would go further and say there's no question in my mind that many of those problems had more to do with Turkish behavior, including domestic factors inside Turkey. But from a NATO perspective, I think how we approach those issues I think it's a prudential question.

We have to keep in mind that the ultimate goal is the cohesion of the NATO alliance as a tool to deter and defend against Russia and eventually also China.

That's priority No. 1. And if in our tactics, even the best intentioned approach, if we undermine that goal I think we're counter-productive.

So I would say the U.S. and other allies can and should pressure Turkey, for example, on S-400 or its other military technological dealings with Russia, its approach to Greece, another NATO member State.

But I put it to you those efforts will be most effective if the pressure is occurring alongside efforts to meet Turkey's legitimate security concerns and make sure that it has a viable Western option in its foreign policy.

So, for example, allies could do a lot better addressing the threat of Syrian missiles to Turkey. It is no less a legitimate NATO job than defending the Baltic States.

We could do a better job of all offering Western technological alternatives to Turkey in a timely fashion, not just from the United States but other European NATO members, alternatives to Russian systems.

And I think we could do a better job of incorporating terrorism, which Turkey has a significant interest in combating, incorporating that more into NATO's core tasks and treating the southern and southeastern dimensions of NATO as priorities.

So the approach should be pressure, yes, criticize, yes. But do so in proportion to how much of a viable alternative we're giving for meeting Turkey's legitimate security concerns.

Mr. FITZPATRICK. So if I could just in contrast, Ukraine, for example, has been a steadfast supporter through their partnership with NATO enduring at the front lines of Russian aggression with deepening cooperation over time, with Turkey working with one of NATO's most looming threats, and Ukraine actively working with our alliance against it.

The open door policy, I believe, must be examined. So I guess my question would be why do you believe it's important for the alliance to not allow Russia's war in eastern Ukraine and illegal annexation

of Crimea to permanently thwart a membership action plan for Ukraine?

Dr. MITCHELL. Well, I think in the case of Ukraine, and again, I'm speaking for myself, the best thing that the United States can do for Ukraine is to arm that country and to prevail upon European allies to arm it.

I think we should keep up the drumbeat on membership action plan. But we should also consider major non-NATO ally status for Ukraine to ease its defense cooperation with the United States. That would be my thinking.

Mr. FITZPATRICK. OK. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, sir.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you.

The chair recognizes Chairman Connolly for 5 minutes.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and again, thank you and the ranking member for this first ever joint hearing. I think it's so important and I think it is an expression of congressional support for the Alliance and for the renewal of NATO on a bipartisan basis.

And I want to thank our very distinguished panel of witnesses, who I think are making a really thoughtful contribution to our dialog about how we move the Alliance forward.

Ambassador Daalder, if I could start with you. You talked about the 2 percent. We certainly agree with you and, by the way, we have been arguing that for years. I mean, it's—it predates the previous administration.

But could you talk a little bit, though, OK, so even if we have reached the 2 percent there are people who are very concerned about the internal State of readiness, military preparedness, obsolescence, lack of operational readiness of equipment and troops within the Alliance itself.

Many people, for example, point to Germany as, you know, really not something that I feel great confidence in. And I just wonder if you could comment on that, too, because that—aside from the 2 percent commitment, what about the military status and capability of NATO today? Should we be confident or should we be concerned or somewhere in between?

Dr. DAALDER. Thank you, Representative Connolly.

I agree with you, one, on the importance of 2 percent as a guidepost, but also the fact that 2 percent doesn't get you what you really need, which is real actual military capability, to be part of the collective defense commitment and the collective security commitment that NATO has.

And on there, we're falling short. I mentioned earlier that the 2 percent guideline, which was adopted in 2014, came after 15 years of steady reduction in European investment in military capabilities, both by cutting defense spending, which in the year 2000 average spending by non-U.S. allies was 2 percent of GDP, and that went down to about 1.25 percent by the time NATO finally agreed to the guidelines.

And then, second, by spending all of the funds that they had on deploying forces in operations and not investing in real capabilities.

And so that's—it's that combination of under investment and underspending that, in some ways, has led to where we are today. And we need a fundamental recommitment to defense by our European allies to take defense more seriously than it has.

Yes, dialog is important. But dialog doesn't work without defense and it's not an alternative to defense.

And I think we need to spend our time talking about readiness, investments in real capabilities, ability to reinforce our forces, and making sure that we have the logistical plans, the contingency plans, all taken seriously, and as we think about new threats that we continue to focus on those real capabilities that are necessary to deal with the threat that already exists today.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you—thank you so much, Mr. Ambassador, and I couldn't agree more. I think we have got to focus on both, not just the 2 percent, although I favor, of course, the 2 percent.

Ambassador Mitchell, I want to thank you for your report and I also—you know, we have a convergence on the whole issue of we need to elevate the whole issue operationally of our commitment to democratic shared values and that's incorporated in your recommendation to the secretary general.

And I want to give you an opportunity to expand on why you thought that was so important and where you think we're likely to go on that, given the fact there's some internal resistance because some people feel that that's threatening or potentially embarrassing.

Dr. MITCHELL. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I also want to thank you and your staff for your engagement and attention to our reflection process as it unfolded, and the ideas that you fed our way were very helpful.

On this issue specifically, as you know, our report devoted a lot of attention to the question of the health of democratic institutions inside NATO. NATO is an alliance founded on democratic principles, and departures from that foundation do weaken the Alliance, I think, in general, but particularly in an era of great power competition, the terms of which are not just material but ideological and political.

And the question, to my mind, is what is the appropriate role for NATO as a security alliance when it comes to those kinds of issues. We debated that at length and we heard a lot of proposals in the Reflection Group.

NATO is a security alliance built on a treaty that requires consensus of all of its members, and I found that in the Reflection Group process of the 30 NATO allies, the capitals that we engaged, I can count on one hand the number of allies who were willing to see NATO play more of a role in strengthening or engaging with domestic democratic institutions.

I think, historically, NATO's approach has been more akin to what Ambassador Gottemoeller described eloquently a moment ago. It has steered away from deeper attempts at influencing, for example, domestic policy.

I think the ultimate goal has to be to strengthen the cohesion of the Alliance, and you wouldn't want to weaken cohesion with finger pointing.

But I think the right role for NATO is to focus on the intersection of democracy with security—with external security threats, which is its core function, and, of course, the Russians and Chinese are very well versed in working internally through corruption and a variety of means to weaken institutions. That's the sweet spot, in my mind.

I think the idea of a democratic resilience center addresses that, and I am disappointed that the communique last week did not endorse recommendation of a resilience center.

My understanding is that a lot of the recommendations from the report are still under examination by the NATO international staff and we'll see if that could gain traction in the future.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you so much. And thank you again, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Chairman Connolly.

The chair recognizes Representative Scott for 5 minutes.

Mr. SCOTT. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I'm going to ask Ms. Gottemoeller to go first and then the others could answer this as well. But we have all spoken to the—to the issue of 2 percent.

As we all know, the domains that we're having to engage in are expanding, not contracting, and so we're talking about space. We're talking about the Arctic. Both of those are extremely expensive to operate in, and we're talking about cyber.

And one of my concerns is where's the 2 percent actually being spent and are there better places to spend it.

Ms. Gottemoeller, you spoke about modernization, that when we talk about modernization we typically think about, you know, ISR and those types of platforms or new planes that are faster, stealthier, or carry more powerful weapons that can be fired from further away.

And that's a key aspect of the modernization that's happening in the United States military. But my question gets to cyber. Offensive actions in cyber, which are still considered in the gray zone, they're very cheap to carry out and they're—and the consequences for those that are the recipient of these aggressive actions are extremely damaging.

We have seen that with the U.S. economy with regard to our food supply chain. It has been occurring in other areas of Europe repeatedly over the last several years. We're just now starting to feel the effects of it inside the United States.

So, Ms. Gottemoeller, cyber—the modernization with regard to how we handle cyber, do you feel like NATO is focused enough on that in developing the offensive capabilities and the defensive capabilities and the sharing of information with regard to real-time information with the attacks and our abilities to both defend against them and to hack back, if you will, against the aggressors?

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Thank you, Mr. Scott, for that extremely timely and complex question.

I would just State briefly that, in fact, NATO sets the requirements for member States to spend their 2 percent and I constantly was aware when I was DSG of the tension often between the requirements that NATO was setting for equipment that would allow for interoperability, that would allow for military effectiveness, es-

pecially in the acquisition of more mobility and more heavy armor at the time, again, when I was DSG for defense against Russia.

But sometimes member States had their own ideas that they wanted to buy fighter aircraft rather than, you know, buy another heavy armor brigade.

So it's a tension that is there. But I do want to stress that NATO sets the requirements and then works with the allies [inaudible].

Mr. KEATING. I can't hear her.

Ms. Gottemoeller, I think we're having some technical difficulties at the moment. Let's just pause for a second.

Could you continue? Could you continue?

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Yes.

Mr. KEATING. We lost you for a moment. Go ahead.

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. OK. Can you hear me now?

Mr. KEATING. Yes.

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. All right. Very good.

About your very important cyber question, the point is that NATO has taken steps in recent years, especially with the adoption of policies that allow for individual member cyber—member States to provide cyber effects to NATO should there be attacks during the course of a crisis or conflict.

And this is, I would say, normal practice in that NATO often does not own the assets but turns to its member States to provide them. So providing offensive cyber effects to NATO is to say now that a number of member States, and it's more than just a handful, have offered to provide to NATO the capability to respond effectively should there be an attack during a NATO mission or operation.

So I actually feel like NATO has been moving in the right direction on this. You bring up the question of information sharing.

Here, there is a continuing tension over the role of attribution with some member States taking a strict view that they themselves must provide an attribution based on shared information, others saying that attribution can be done by the State under attack and then others should follow along in supporting them.

So it is a matter of some stress and tension within the Alliance. But I think the move is in the right direction.

Mr. SCOTT. Ma'am, thank you very much. My time has almost expired. My concern is what the cyber-attacks are doing to our economy and, as we all know, the economic ties are strong. They could be stronger and should be stronger.

But when Russia takes aggressive actions against U.S. economic interest or the economic interests of our allies, that creates disruptions that have a tremendous impact on our citizens and the well-being of the world and our NATO partnership. And so I appreciate your comments.

Mr. Chair, I'm over by just a few seconds, but I'll certainly yield to the chair. Thank you again for being here.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Representative Scott.

The chair recognizes Vice Chair Spanberger for 5 minutes.

Ms. SPANBERGER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

To our witnesses, thank you so much for being here. I'd like to follow with—in the line of d

So, Ms. Gottemoeller, you said that NATO is moving in the right direction, and I hope that we see NATO moving in the right direction aggressively because, certainly, we have seen the impact here at home of not having the cyber defenses in place that are necessary.

But, Ambassador Daalder, I'd like to go to you quickly in this context. I'm wondering how you view that the United States can best support NATO's efforts to build cyber resilience in defense, and how the United States can be part of really encouraging NATO as an entity to aggressively move in the direction of ensuring our cyber defenses are what they need to be, not just now but recognizing increasing and ever-changing threats that exist in the cyber realm.

Dr. DAALDER. Well, thank you so much for the question. I think this is one of the key issues that the Alliance faces, and we should recognize the Alliance has done a lot over the last 10 years. This is an issue that has beset allies for a long time.

The critical point it has focused on is defense of its own systems to make sure that the systems that we have operate effectively and that allies are able to help each other if they are attacked with cyber defensive measures of all kinds.

I think the next step was to recognize that cyber could be deeply destructive, so destructive that it was akin to an armed attack—that's what it says, again, in the Brussels communique—and therefore could lead to Article 5.

The issue that I think NATO needs to focus on more is cyber offense. That is, what are the cyber offensive capabilities, both in order to enhance defense that the best way to get to the defensive stance I to be in the systems of those who are attacking us, and as a means to deter attack in the first place.

And I think a major step was made when President Biden in his press conference in Geneva made very clear that we were prepared to use cyber-attacks in response to further attacks on the United States, particularly, the 16 critical infrastructure targets that are part of our own domestic guidelines.

We ought to make that part of the NATO thinking both in terms of the infrastructure that we're talking about, the target systems, and the way in which we can have defensive as well as offensive capabilities and I very much hope that as part of the Strategic Concept we will dive deeply into this and be more forward leaning than we have had—been in the past on the issue of using offensive capabilities as a means to deter attack in the first place.

Ms. SPANBERGER. Thank you so much, Mr. Ambassador, and I do hope that we can be really leading the charge, echoing the president's comments in Geneva related to the need to be on the offensive in the space.

Ms. Gottemoeller, if I could pivot back to you. In December of last year, you wrote a very interesting piece in Politico where you examined how NATO was really rethinking its Strategic Concept, part of the NATO 2030 report, and you mentioned where China is concerned NATO should develop a political approach focused on the Euro-Atlantic space that recognizes China's new role in the world.

I think this is an important frame and I was hoping that you might be able to walk us through this approach, what it would look

like, and what steps the Alliance should be taking in the context of contending with China.

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Thank you very much, Ms. Spanberger. Again, a very important question. I will refer back to Anders Fogh Rasmussen's remarks about how China is inserting itself into the Euro-Atlantic space, in particular, buying up infrastructure, which could hamper NATO mobility in time of crisis or conflict.

So I think that NATO should be ready to engage with China and to, for one thing, just have a situational awareness at the top level so it understands what exactly is going on and what it may need to counter in terms of China operating in its space.

Whether in the—in the commercial space, so to say, or else in the military space, it is exercising together with the Russian Federation, for example, in the Baltic Sea.

So situational awareness is all important, but also being able to talk straight and talk tough to China about NATO's interests, and here I endorse fully the political military dialog that has been going on between NATO and China, the Chinese foreign ministry, because it gives an opportunity to talk about NATO's concerns but also talk about where there may be some joint interests.

For example, the upcoming discussions are on the arms control topic, and getting China to come to the negotiating table, I think, has been an important goal for the United States, certainly, on certain critical topics.

So I think there is definitely a way in which NATO must be able to engage with China. But my own view is it's not in the Indo-Pacific. It's actually in the European space.

Ms. SPANBERGER. Well, thank you so much, Ms. Gottemoeller. And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you, again, to our witnesses.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you.

I've been informed that we're having some technical issues on the broadcast out. So I'm just going to ask us to just pause maybe just for a few minutes and see if they can square those away. We're going to recognize Representative Wagner next and then proceed with the hearing.

But let's just see if we can rectify these things in a very few minutes. So take a chance. By a few minutes, I'm hoping three or 4 minutes. So let's see how we're doing then and let's recess for that short period, if there's no objection. Thank you.

[Recess.]

Mr. KEATING. I'd like to call the committee back in order. There seems to be a technical issue throughout the whole Capitol area with other committees.

However, we can hear each other. We're able to communicate. Our witnesses can hear the questions. Our members can hear the witnesses' dialog and answering those questions.

So it's my feeling that although some of the broadcasts out they're working on the technical difficulties, I don't want to hold up this hearing, given the limited time and the importance of the hearing.

So I will reconvene and now recognize Representative Wagner for 5 minutes.

Mrs. WAGNER. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and for hosting the hearing and our witnesses. I want to thank you for your time in support of this critical Alliance.

NATO has served as a pillar of international peace and stability and security for decades. Yet, Russia and the People's Republic of China have repeatedly shown that they view the cooperation of free and democratic States as a threat.

It is clear that a strong and united NATO will be absolutely crucial as we confront authoritarian challenges to the rules-based order.

Dr. Mitchell, Russia sent over 100,000 additional troops to the Ukraine's border this spring just a few months after it unilaterally imposed restrictions on naval movement near Crimea.

Ukraine is an important NATO partner and Russia's threatening behavior is a worrying signal that it is willing to escalate its illegal offensive in Ukraine.

In light of these developments, the Biden administration's decision to freeze a military aid package intended for Ukraine following the Biden-Putin summit, I think, sends mixed signals.

Can you please tell us, Mr. Mitchell—Dr. Mitchell, pardon me—what is the current status of Russia's military buildup near Ukraine and how should NATO manage this crisis?

Dr. MITCHELL. Well, Representative Wagner, thank you for that question. I think you've touched on a very important issue and that's one that I'm sure is dear to the hearts of everyone on the call, and that is the status of Ukraine and its struggle to be an independent and democratic country on the borders of Russia.

To answer your question directly, I also know what I've seen from public reporting, but it appears that there is still a significant concentration of Russian troops near the border of Ukraine.

It appears that some of those assets were removed in the lead-up to the summit. I only know what I've seen in public reporting again, so I don't know the exact status.

But I would say with regard to the meeting with Putin, diplomacy does have an important role to play at times, including in interactions with our most serious and determined opponents.

I think in this particular case, the fact that the president's meeting with Mr. Putin came on the heels of a major Russian military buildup in Ukraine, I think that has—that looks from the perspective of a lot of U.S. allies in the region like a major concession. I think the fact that the meeting itself was a kind of win for Putin or it can certainly be—

Mrs. WAGNER. That is—Dr. Mitchell—Dr. Mitchell, what is NATO doing? What's NATO doing? This is a crisis.

Dr. MITCHELL. Well, NATO, of course, has partnership activities with Ukraine, but because Ukraine is not an Article 5 ally in NATO, there are limits to what NATO can do to provide direct military assistance. NATO is very active in Ukraine in training and—

Mrs. WAGNER. Dr. Mitchell—I'm going to cut you off and reclaim my time here. I've got very limited time, many more questions.

Dr. Mitchell, you've written that the old policy of hoping growth and enmeshment with—will turn China into a country that plays by established rules should be abandoned. What allies and areas

should the U.S. Government prioritize to confront the People's Republic of China?

Dr. MITCHELL. Well, I think the most urgent in a NATO context is to have China be squarely on the agenda for the North Atlantic Council. I think it needs to permeate the existing structures and committees of NATO.

And as our report recommended, and I was sorry to not see this in the communique last week, I think there needs to be a platform at NATO where the North Atlantic Council and the European Council can coordinate on security concerns vis-a-vis China much the way that the COCOM structure did during the cold war.

I think, beyond that, there's a lot that NATO could do to, as Ambassador Gottemoeller said, improve our defenses against Chinese subversive activities inside Europe. I'm thinking of European infrastructure, military technological relationships between NATO allies—

Mrs. WAGNER. Dr. Mitchell—Dr. Mitchell, I want to get one more question in and just so they can be answered maybe in writing. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the only NATO aspirant with a membership action plan, Russia is exploiting ethnic divisions among Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks to stall Bosnia's accession.

And just a few months ago, the Russian embassy in Bosnia issued a statement—a statement threatening that, and I quote, "In the event of practical rapprochement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and NATO, our country—meaning Russia—will have to react to this hostile step." It was pretty stunning, I think, that they—that they did this.

I don't know, Ms. Gottemoeller, I don't know—in writing if you could respond to what we think NATO allies and the United States can do to combat these dangerous tactics to deter Russians malign activity in Bosnia.

I'm out of time, so I will yield back. But if you could, Ms. Gottemoeller, respond in writing to me and anyone else. I'm very concerned about what's happening in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thank you.

Mr. KEATING. Well, thank you, Representative. I've been informed and advised by the full committee that there's still some technical issues we have that could be in violation of rules if we continued before that's rectified.

So I'm going to have to—I'm going to—

Good news is I've just been informed—breaking news—the technical issue has been resolved. So I'm glad we have continued forward and the chair will now recognize Representative Larsen for 5 minutes.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Just have a couple of questions and perhaps we'll start with Secretary General Rasmussen and then go to former Deputy Secretary General Gottemoeller regarding NATO and Indo-Pacific.

How should the—how should the U.S. approach the choice about whether or not to do—to act within NATO decisionmaking, NATO confines when, say, doing a freedom of navigation operation or any other activity to show a NATO face versus doing operations, say, with folks who are NATO allies but not doing it under a NATO banner?

Does one or the other make any difference? Is it better for us to try to elevate NATO or is it better for us to move ahead with allies even though it won't be due—it won't be under a NATO rubric?

We'll start with—we'll start with—yes, Mr. Rasmussen.

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Yes. Thank you very much for that question.

As a point of departure, I think we should elevate as many activities as possible to the NATO level. If I understand you correctly, you are speaking about exercises and other activities.

But I think in general—in general we should demonstrate solidarity and a collective will to strengthen our defense through NATO exercises and also through joint and common funding and joint acquisition of the capabilities.

And I fully agree with those who said the 2 percent target is important as a guideline, but it's not enough, and I will draw your attention to another target—another guideline, namely, 20 percent should be used in new abilities and research and development.

And it is a fact that we could get much more value for money if we acquire critical capabilities and extensive military capabilities jointly instead of on a national basis. So also in that respect, I prefer NATO to national efforts.

Mr. LARSEN. That's fine. Former Deputy Secretary General Gottemoeller, can I give you about a minute and 20 seconds to answer that question specifically with regards to NATO and the Indo-Pacific?

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Yes, thank you, sir. My view, strongly held, is that, in fact, NATO member States are very active with their freedom of navigation exercises, the U.K., the U.S., France, and partner States such as Australia. This is very important.

My own view is that NATO is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as I mentioned in my testimony. Their center of gravity is in the trans-Atlantic space and, furthermore, NATO per se is responsible for the defense of the Alliance in the Euro-Atlantic space.

So I, in some ways, see the continuing focus of NATO to defend NATO in the Euro-Atlantic space, rather than moving its operation, so to say, to the Indo-Pacific. That would be my strongly held views, sir.

On a personal level, I do think it's important that NATO pay attention to its core—its core mission and that includes, of course, its core tasks, the defense of NATO Europe.

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, thank you. I just would note in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly we get this push and pull about the eastern flank and the southern flank, depending on which member State is talking to us as NATO Parliamentary Assembly members from—or the United States. And so, you know, at the Indo-Pacific then we have got a third push and pull.

I've got 38 seconds left, and for Dr. Mitchell, President Connolly appointed me to be one of three members on a contact group with the Ukraine parliamentarians. It's a group chaired by Ojars Kalnins from Latvia.

And just about the Crimean platform, and could you—could you address that quickly with regards to the importance of not recognizing the illegal occupation of Crimea and what we can do within NATO and how NATO should approach that, in 9 seconds?

Dr. MITCHELL. It's incredibly important. NATO has said the right things. I think the most important thing for your important mission is that we not let up or slack in our efforts to showcase the illegality of that annexation.

I think what the Russians want most is by degrees to see certain Western European States, first de facto and then eventually de jure, start to recognize that.

So I think just keep keeping closed ranks on it is the most important thing we can do.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Representative.

The chair recognizes Representative Meijer.

Mr. MELJER. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And then thank you to our witnesses who are here today and on this for—and to the committee for—the subcommittee for hosting this important hearing on our NATO Alliance, specifically NATO 2030 and both, you know, celebrating the origins and reevaluating, you know, how we go toward the future as we are continuing to focus on our shared values across the Atlantic, as we adapt from a cold war mentality to one that is really pitting democracies versus autocratic regimes, especially in Europe, but also toward some of our shared commitments that we have made abroad, as we mark the withdrawal of United States forces from Afghanistan, the only invocation of Article 5.

Now, NATO Secretary Jens Stoltenberg had identified the need for more societal and economic resilience from the allies, you know, the importance of safer and more diverse supply lines as well in the fuel, food, and medical spaces in particular.

During this pandemic, we have also seen some of the challenges with both our supply chain resiliency domestically but also some of the risks that a more globalized world holds, and then specifically on the military front and on the national security front, what can happen when we are overly reliant on international supply chains over which we do not have full control.

One of the areas that deeply concerns me when it comes to our NATO alliance is the construction of Nord Stream 2, an additional Russian economic leverage over many of our northern European allies.

I guess this question first. I strongly wish to target to Mr. Rasmussen do you believe the construction of Nord Stream 2 and that increase of natural gas dependence, especially for heating, is that a step toward or away from that broader concern that Secretary Stoltenberg mentioned about resilience?

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Thank you very much for that key question. To speak directly, I'm against Nord Stream 2. Nord Stream 2 is not an economic project. Nord Stream 2 is geopolitical project aiming at maintaining a European dependence on imported Russian gas.

So it is as simple as that, and I strongly regret that it seems as if the Russians are now able to finish the project. It remains to be seen whether the pipeline will actually be used. That will very much depend on the U.S., European Union, and Germany.

And in conclusion, I hope if it's finished that it will not be used, because it also serves the purpose to circumvent the Eastern European allies that will lose a lot of fees and duties.

So it's clear it is part of President Putin's overall ambition to dominate Western Europe.

Mr. MEIJER. Thank you. Thank you, sir.

I mean, you mentioned kind of those Eastern European leverage points and as well, you know, we can have discussions on whether or not we have—we look toward, you know, the future membership of certain States within NATO and if that is advantageous to the Alliance to join.

I firmly believe those are discussions that should be made within the Alliance and not discussions that are influenced by the malign activities of outside powers, specifically Russia, and the additional leverage that they may hold.

It does not portend for those decisions to be made, you know, on their merits but, rather, giving our Russian adversaries a greater ability to exercise that leverage.

And I guess, Mr. Rasmussen, if I could also just followup with a quick final question before my time expires. You know, a recent Brussels Summit communique had identified combating corruption, promoting an inclusive political process, and decentralization reform based on democratic values, respect for human rights, minorities and the rule of law, noted these areas as priority reforms, specifically around Ukraine's membership.

And I guess, just real quickly, how does Ukraine's record in these areas compare with current NATO member countries like Turkey, Poland, and Hungary?

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Unfortunately, I didn't hear the whole question because of technical issues. But, in short, I think Ukraine as well as Georgia qualifies for membership of NATO, to go directly to the bottom line. But Putin tries to prevent them from seeking membership by fueling conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and the Odesa region in Ukraine.

And we shouldn't let him have a veto. It's a decision for NATO and the applicant countries.

Mr. MEIJER. I could not agree more.

And, Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. So I yield back. Thank you.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Representative.

The chair will recognize Representative Titus for 5 minutes. I'd like to inform the other members that our hard stop has been extended because of the technical difficulties an additional 10 minutes. So if you're keeping track, we'll be able to go at least till 12:10.

The chair recognizes Representative Titus for 5 minutes.

Ms. TITUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

All of the questions this morning and the discussion have really kind of revolved around several things, and one of them has certainly been Russian interference or how we push back against the tension of Russian interference.

Secretary General, I'd like to ask you just kind of a specific question along the lines about North Macedonia. One of the conditions of North Macedonia for getting into NATO, which was a great accomplishment—they've been trying to do it for a long time—was

the name change which they had a referendum and so did Greece to allow that to happen.

We heard that there was considerable Russian interference in that election process. I wonder if you are seeing that—if that is accurate, or if you are seeing that in other places as one of the ways they're trying to exert influence and challenge the widening or broadening of NATO membership.

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Thank you very much. I can, clearly confirm that the Russians tried to derail the referendum campaign in North Macedonia.

Actually, I was engaged or I am engaged and I'm co-chairing something called the Trans-Atlantic Commission on Election Integrity, and we have deployed tools to detect such activities, among other places, in North Macedonia.

And we could confirm Russian interference and interference had the aim to get people to abstain from voting because a low turnout would make the referendum outcome nonbinding.

But the bottom line is they didn't succeed. Fortunately, an agreement was reached and North Macedonia became a member of NATO. So they didn't succeed. But it's not the only place.

Now we're watching Germany. We'll have German elections in September this year, and I would expect heavy, heavy Russian efforts to meddle into those elections.

And I wouldn't exclude Chinese attempts to do exactly the same. China has a key interest in an adoption of an investment agreement between European Union and China, and Germany has so far been in favor of that. So they want to influence the outcome of the German elections.

Ms. TITUS. Well, we have certainly seen it here and I suspected that it was abroad, too. So thank you for being on that commission to keep an eye on these things.

You know, when you interfere with elections, it doesn't get more basic than that. Just one other quick question. I wanted to ask about climate change and how it's related to what's happening in the Arctic. Anybody can answer this. But, you know, there are new shipping lanes now and the resource-rich regions are now more accessible.

But recent Russian military expansion in the region could threaten our equitable access to these areas and I wonder if NATO is involved in any way and assure that it's done and any kind of exploration is done in an equitable manner.

Mr. RASMUSSEN. It should develop a clear Arctic strategy. You're quite right. We have seen Russia reopen abandoned Soviet air bases and military facilities in the Arctic.

So Russia is about to militarize the Arctic, and NATO has a responsibility to—according to Article 5, we are all responsible for helping each other. So the Arctic members of NATO could expect that NATO develop an Arctic strategy in order to counter that Russian militarization of the Arctic.

Ms. TITUS. Is that in—is that in process? Is there a committee working on that or—

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Yes, it is in process. Yes, it is in process.

Ms. TITUS. All right.

Mr. RASMUSSEN. But I can tell you when I was secretary general at NATO it was impossible to move forward because of Canadian resistance. But Canada has gradually changed its position to now it's a work in progress in NATO.

Ms. TITUS. Well, thank you very much. I yield back.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Representative.

The chair recognizes Representative Tenney for 5 minutes.

Ms. TENNEY. Thank you, Chairman Keating and Chairman Connolly, for convening this important hearing today to look at NATO's future. And I want to thank all the witnesses for their very insightful testimony. Also, thank you to our Ranking Members Fitzpatrick and Scott.

Preserving the Western Alliance is one of the key foreign policy challenges that we face. Our strong community of nations must adapt to adversaries like Russia and China, as we know so well.

The United States cannot do this alone, and it is vital that Europe continues to be a central pillar of our international Alliance system.

Which brings me my first question for Dr. Mitchell. The United States has accepted and honored our share of the responsibilities for European security by being clear on our commitment to NATO and Article 5, and pouring billions of dollars into the defense of Europe.

But our efforts can be counterproductive if they're not met by a willingness on the part of European allies to defend their own continent.

Europeans cannot expect Americans to care more about their security than they do with Nord Stream 2 being a perfect example and referenced earlier.

What can we do realistically to make European countries share more of the—be more equitable partners and enjoin efforts to preserve the security that we need from these NATO allies?

Dr. MITCHELL. Well, thank you, Representative, for that question. I think in some ways that is the most important question facing the United States when we look at our alliance structures not only in Europe but in Asia in an era of great power competition.

And we have seen successive administrations try different tactics. The Obama Administration tried charm. The Trump administration tried pressure. It's not always clear that either of those work.

Under the Trump administration, European countries in NATO increased defense spending by something like \$140 billion. But I think the reality is, and this is in your—the premise of your question, European NATO is not doing nearly enough.

By my count right now, I see 10 allies spending 2 percent and I think, increasingly, given the two-front challenge that United States has with China and Russia, the 2 percent goal in Europe—in NATO is a receding *de minimis* requirement.

I mean, this is the wealthiest alliance of nations on earth, and I think American taxpayers have a right to ask at a moment when we have a \$25 trillion U.S. debt, why, in a way, we're indirectly subsidizing European social benefits. I don't think those questions are going to go away.

The key point to grasp, I think, is that it's no longer just a matter of fairness or tax dollar stewardship. I think it's a strategic imperative.

If Europe doesn't take on more of the defense burden vis-a-vis Russia, the United States physically will struggle to be able to handle a major crisis in the Western Pacific if there were crises in, say, the Baltic and South China Sea at the same time.

I'm of the personal opinion that we have to be willing to be creative, and so speaking for myself and not the Reflection Group, to answer your question I would say we should allow the Europeans to pool more of their capabilities as long as that effort is harnessed to NATO capability targets.

So I would favor, for example, the creation of a European level of ambition under the NATO awning that results in Europe being able to field fully 50 percent of the capabilities and enablers in the European area.

That would be preferable, to my mind, both to the current slow improvement in defense spending and to the European strategic autonomy idea, which I think could be pernicious to NATO cohesion and capabilities.

Frankly, I don't know how we will hit the goal otherwise. I think we can keep pressuring allies. But I would favor getting creative on a European level of ambition inside NATO.

Ms. TENNEY. Thank you for the answer. Well, let me just followup with that. How would you—what steps would you actually suggest that the Biden administration take to move them in that direction?

I mean, as you said, there was charm and then there was pressure, but President Trump did have some success with pressure moving some of the Allies up, especially Germany.

Germany has, you know, the wealthiest of all the other NATO nations. How did we get Germany, for example, to be—to comply and, you know, especially in light of what I mentioned earlier, the Nord Stream 2 issue where the Biden administration lifted the sanctions and now we have, you know, this pipeline that is actually hurting some of our allies in Europe?

Dr. MITCHELL. Well, I think that's an important question and I'm—frankly, I think the administration has to keep up the pressure on Germany. I hope it will. It's not clear to me from some of the statements of senior Biden administration officials if we are still pressuring the Germans.

I think the Trump administration, one of its greatest accomplishments in Europe was a significant increase in defense spending from a number of European allies.

And I disagree slightly with my friend, Ivo. I think the 2 percent metric in Germany's case would be a game changer. If Germany were spending 2 percent of its GDP on defense tomorrow, it would have a defense establishment, roughly, the size of Russia's.

So I would say keep up the pressure, No. 1. No. 2, be willing to be creative. As I've said on European level of ambition inside NATO, that would go—it would be heterodoxical from the traditional U.S. approach to NATO. But as long as those are harnessed to European capability targets, and I think the administration would have the political—possess the political support throughout

much of Europe to broach a reform like that within NATO, I think it would find a lot of support. Perhaps not from the French, but I think it would be moving in the right direction to put creative ideas on the table.

Ms. TENNEY. Thank you so much. My time has run out. But I greatly appreciate your insight, Dr. Mitchell.

I yield back.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. The chair recognizes Representative Wild for 5 minutes.

Ms. WILD. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to direct my question to Mr. Rasmussen first.

In your estimation, sir, has the Erdogan government in Turkey respected its commitments under Article 8 of the NATO charter?

Specifically, I'm referring to its actions against the Kurds in northern Syria and its multiple instances of belligerent behavior in the Mediterranean.

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Thank you very much. My brief answer is no. Turkey has not honored its—I would say its obligation to act cohesively within NATO. That goes for the intervention in Syria. That goes in Libya. That is true with Cyprus, and also the purchase of Russian military equipment.

In all those areas, Turkey does not live up to what we might expect. Having said that, I would add I also think NATO should have done more previously, for instance, in Syria to establish a no-fly zone. We discussed it during my mandate as secretary general. But we couldn't achieve consensus within NATO and, consequently, the Turks concluded that they had to do something themselves.

So I do believe that, in particular, the Europeans should realize that they should be stronger and engaged in their new neighborhood in the Middle East, for instance.

Ms. WILD. Well, thank you. We have seen a change in rhetoric from President Erdogan recently, but it's not clear yet whether that rhetorical shift will be accompanied by a substantive change in Turkish foreign policy.

In your view, what are the most strategic steps that the U.S. can take together with our allies, of course, to promote genuine cooperation, de-escalation, and better communication with Turkey?

Mr. RASMUSSEN. I think we have seen a change of Erdogan's rhetoric. We have also seen rapprochement between Turkey and the European Union and European allies because he realizes that if he continues on the current path he will be in conflict with not least the American president.

I think words matter and it's clear to me that the U.S. should continue to press Turkey in particular to do what the U.S. can do to prevent continued Turkish-Russian cooperation on military equipment. I consider that the most dangerous element in the relationship between Turkey and the U.S. and within NATO.

By the way, we have recently seen that the Turks have increased their military cooperation with Ukraine. I also consider that a step in the right direction. So I think we should continue to pressure Turkey on those issues.

Ms. WILD. What about Turkey's human rights abuses? I'm particularly concerned about their continuing crackdown on opposition-elected officials and dissidents. Thoughts on that?

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Yes, but I can't agree more. I think it's a major—it is really a major problem. But on the other hand, I don't think external pressure on issues like democracy, freedom, human rights, et cetera, will result in any change.

On the contrary, it might strengthen the current government in Turkey, and I think we owe it to—and we shouldn't forget half of the Turkish population voted against Erdogan and his party in recent elections, and we owe to that half to continue our dialog, our critical dialog, with Ankara. We also have a strategic interest in keeping Turkey within, I would say, a Western-oriented and reform-oriented course.

Ms. WILD. Thank you. I appreciate those comments.

And with that, Mr. Chair, I yield back.

[No response.]

Ms. WILD. Mr. Chair, I think you're muted.

Mr. KEATING. The chair recognizes Representative Pfluger for 5 minutes. Thank you.

Mr. PFLUGER. You all good? Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to all the panelists today.

I actually served 2 years in NATO stationed in Europe and as a member of the U.S. Air Force was delighted to be able to serve with 17 different countries at that particular location.

I have a great appreciation for the impact that this organization brings, you know, not only to our member countries but, really, to the stability of the world. And so thank you for everybody's previous service, your testimony today, the thoughts and ideas.

I want to kind of hone in on something that I think is really important. You know, when we—when we look at what each country can do in NATO and what each country should do, I appreciate the previous comments when it comes to the participation, not just—not just financially with the 2 percent standard but also in these niche capabilities and specifically with regards to infrastructure.

And, Mr. Secretary, if I could start with you. You know, I have several other questions. But, you know, one of the investments that NATO members are making in the way of infrastructure so that the rapid agile deployment of forces, which I think is a competitive advantage that we have as NATO as a—as a whole, you know, what are those infrastructure investments that are being made or need to be made, and then what are the obstacles that can hinder that?

Because when it comes to it, access, overflight, and basing are so important to this organization. So, Mr. Secretary, if you can comment on that briefly.

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Thank you very much. I think the most important investment we could do in Europe is to invest in transport capacity.

We have more soldiers, actually, or more troops in Europe than the U.S., but we can't move them. Whenever Europeans decide to participate in an international operation we have to ask the United States for transport capacity.

So it's, clearly, a critical capacity that we need to focus on. So speaking about infrastructure, I think transport capacity is the most important area at all.

But in addition to that, we all need more in intelligence, reconnaissance, drones, all the modern military capabilities. We are lacking those capabilities in Europe. In the Libya operation, for instance, we were very much dependent on U.S. capabilities.

Mr. PFLUGER. Well, thank you for that. Let me follow this up with looking at some of our most vulnerable members in the Baltic countries, and I spent a lot of time talking to Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and the—specifically those countries but also the other ones that are on the eastern flank.

You know, are we engaging non-NATO partner nations with these common security concerns and what are we doing to bolster specifically those countries and others that fall into that category of vulnerability?

Mr. RASMUSSEN. We have already discussed Georgia and Ukraine, and I think an immediate first step should be to grant the two countries a Membership Action Plan and that way create a much more solid framework for our cooperation with those two partners.

There is no guarantee for future membership and it's for them and NATO to decide, not for President Putin to intervene in that. And I think we could prevent his de facto veto against membership by deploying exactly the same principle as we did when Western Germany became a member of NATO and we left Eastern Germany outside the Article 5 guarantee.

We could do exactly the same when it comes to Georgia and Ukraine and State, OK, you could become members but Article 5 will only cover those areas under control of your government Tbilisi and Kyiv. That will be a formula that would actually deactivate President Putin's de facto veto.

And in the Balkans we have exactly the same issue with the same challenges.

Mr. PFLUGER. Well, thank you very much for that.

In my remaining 20 seconds, let me just say that I applaud Lithuania and their decision to leave the 17+1 cooperation framework over their concerns over the People's Republic of China's predatory and debt-trapping diplomacy that includes growing malign influence.

I applaud it and I think that we as NATO, as a group, should continue to look for ways to counterbalance Chinese malign influence in addition to the Russian influence that we see.

So with that, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I appreciate everyone's service to this—to this organization and believe in NATO and its ability to stand up to the malign influence of actors around the world.

I yield back.

Mr. KEATING. The chair recognizes Representative Schneider for 5 minutes.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank you and Mr. Connolly for leading this meeting, as well as ranking members and our witnesses, in particular a hometown call out to Ambassador Daalder and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. It's good to see you.

I appreciate having this conversation highlighting the importance of NATO and, in particular, the significance of NATO 2030.

I also appreciate the concerns that we have raised over the course of this meeting, everything from dealing with China and Russia, concerns about cyber, the burden sharing.

I want to give a special commendation to my colleague from Pennsylvania, Representative Wild, on asking the questions about Turkey. This has been a great opportunity for us to reaffirm Congress' support for NATO and discuss what the coming decade holds for what is, clearly, our most important strategic partnership.

During the Trump administration many in Congress, including myself, were concerned about President Trump's lack of a clear outward commitment to our obligation to Article 5, the central tenet of NATO and our collective self-defense.

To our allies around the world President Trump's wavering sowed doubt about the United States commitment to NATO and our other strategic partnerships. Given the overwhelming bipartisan support for NATO in both the House and the Senate, Congress pushed back.

In the 115th Congress the only legislative item, either amendment or bill, to pass the Senate with a vote of 100 to zero was an amendment during the consideration of the National Defense Authorization Act that affirmed our commitment to Article 5.

In the 116th Congress, the last Congress, one of our first bills voted out of the House was legislation by my colleague, Representative Panetta, the NATO Support Act, that would prevent the use of funds to effectuate any withdrawal from NATO. The bill passed overwhelmingly on suspension.

President Biden's comments and work at the summit in Brussels went a long way toward mending any doubt about our fidelity to NATO and Article 5 and I am certain he will continue to make clear our ironclad commitment to NATO and our strategic allies.

Ultimately, our experience under President Trump left me deeply concerned about a future president with similar disdain for alliances, fundamentally undermining our most important strategic partnership without Congress being able to meaningfully push back.

Ambassador Daalder, I'll start with you. But my general question is what can Congress do to further demonstrate U.S. support of and commitment to NATO and make sure that that commitment is iron clad?

Dr. DAALDER. Thank you, Congressman, for the question. And I think what the Congress did in the last 4 years and, as you mentioned, the two major votes that were taken in both the House and the Senate with near unanimity in both cases, was a very important signal to our allies that whatever a particular occupant in the White House may say, Congress, and indeed, in our polling at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs the American people stand squarely behind this alliance.

And reminding folks of that reality constantly is extremely important. I'm, therefore, very pleased that the NATO Parliamentary Assembly is being supported so strongly by Congress because I think that's another way in which to demonstrate America's commitment and to hold administration officials when they start to deviate from the treaty obligations that we have accountable for those facts as much as possible.

In the end, I think NATO still remains an organization with very strong support in Congress. It's one of the few bipartisan issues where in which Republicans and Democrats and Americans agree on and I think demonstrating that in as best way possible constantly is a necessary and important reminder to our allies that this is an alliance that meets our security interest as much as it does for other members.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Great, thank you. Let me shift to my 1 minute left to the climate. Coordinating our international response to climate change will be critical to fully living up to our responsibility to prevent catastrophic changes to the Earth's climate, as we have seen around the Earth already this summer and in years past.

But we know that climate change is a threat multiplier, driving drought and famine, wildfires and flooding, transnational migration and regional conflict.

How can NATO best adapt? How is it adapting its strategic outlook to incorporate climate as a threat multiplier and driver of regional conflict?

And that's to anybody.

Dr. Gottemoeller?

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Thank you very much, Congressman. That is a great question. I am so pleased to see the results of the latest NATO summit with regard to the emphasis on climate.

It has been really strongly called out now by the NATO heads of State and government as an overarching strategic objective to take account of these climate crises that are emerging.

Talking about the Arctic, we have already mentioned that. So I do think that the Alliance now has turned its attention to this in a significant way.

I will just note the contrast a short while ago during the previous administration. It was not possible to do so. So I'm very glad that this issue of climate will be front and center in NATO considerations and in NATO policy development. Thank you, sir.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Great. Thank you, and I see my time has expired. I yield back.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Representative.

The chair recognizes Representative Malliotakis for 5 minutes.

Ms. MALLIOTAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really enjoyed today's discussion. It was very enlightening. I want to thank those who came to testify.

I wanted to followup on some questions one of my colleagues asked earlier regarding Turkey. In 2020, Turkey engaged in 2,060 violations of Atlantic airspace, including 384 mock dogfights and 3,025 violations of Greece's territorial waters.

You know, I think it's certainly a violation of Greek airspace. It violates both international and U.S. laws, including the Arms Export Control Act.

In addition to that, we saw the U.S. Government impose sanctions on Turkey in December 2020 for Turkey's purchase of Russia's S-400 system, and also Turkey now openly supports Hamas, a widely designated anti-Israel terrorist organization, and has aided and abetted ISIS and that's well documented.

You know, certainly, not only do these things violate international U.S. law, but it's also one of—against one of the endorsed priorities that resulted from the NATO 2030 initiative.

And so, I know Mr. Rasmussen has already commented. I'd love to hear from the other guests today if they believe that these actions undermine the integrity of NATO and what can and should NATO do to address these violations by one of its members.

Mr. Mitchell is raising his hand.

Dr. MITCHELL. Thank you for that incredibly important question. I think these are extremely concerning actions on Turkey's part, and let me just say I think the single most important thing we can do at the U.S. level is to deepen our defense and security cooperation with Greece, No. 1, No. 2, to treat Cyprus like a vulnerable Western partner rather than just a U.N. reunification project in the making.

The Trump administration introduced an eastern Mediterranean strategy that I think got the emphasis—the points of emphasis, basically, right. I hope that will continue.

In the past, the United States has been a little bit cautious about engagement with Greece and Cyprus. But I think offsetting—the offsetting role that the United States can play in the region is significant and it actually helps to bolster our efforts at working closely with Turkey.

So I wouldn't, for example, go so far as some of the recommendations that I heard during the Reflection Group process from experts about using NATO as a tool to—a punitive tool vis-a-vis Turkey. I think there are real perils to that approach.

But I think the established practice of the secretary general offering his or her good services—good offices to mediate between Greece and Turkey is the most important thing that NATO can do.

Ms. MALLIOTAKIS. Yes, Mr. Rasmussen?

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Yes, if I may add to this just the following reflection. I think what we have seen in the Middle East is what happens when the United States retreats and retrenches, namely, you will leave behind a vacuum and that vacuum will be filled by the bad guys.

That's exactly what happened when the U.S. disengaged in Syria. Who moved in? Turkey, Russia, Iran. So I can only recommend stay engaged, demonstrate determined American global leadership. That is a way to keep the autocrats at bay.

Ms. MALLIOTAKIS. Yes. I mean, I believe that NATO and the Western Alliance need to call out Turkey for their ties in support of terrorist groups but also for their aggression in the Mediterranean and Aegean.

I have one last question, which I'm going to try to squeeze in quickly. NATO has identified a need for anti-submarine warfare capabilities to combat a growing adversarial submarine threat specifically from an increased Russia presence. Currently, the U.S. Navy fills a lot of the mission requirements for NATO with its fleet of P-8 Poseidon aircraft.

I was wondering if you can talk about the existing submarine threat and the requirement for NATO to address a capability gap.

Mr. Daalder, if he's available or—Mr. Daalder?

Dr. DAALDER. Thank you, Congresswoman. I think the growing submarine threat from the north, just building on what Secretary Rasmussen said with regard to the Arctic, more generally, is a greater concern. For the first time in decades we're worried about the GIUK, the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap being penetrated easily by submarines.

So we need a response to that, and the best response is what NATO was trying to put together, which is like it has done with AWACS, like it has done with ground surveillance systems, is a NATO capability which shares the responsibility and the funding for an anti-submarine capability that will be able to operate not only in the north but around the seas to defend the United States—to defend NATO and the countries. The U.S. will contribute to this.

But I think the NATO countries don't have the resources to just buy these pieces of PA and other capabilities by themselves, and doing it collectively as it's done with air transportation, as is done with AWACS, as is done with ground surveillance systems is the way for NATO to contribute best to the security of the North Atlantic area.

Ms. MALLIOTAKIS. Thank you. And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing him to complete the answer. Appreciate it.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. Finally, the chair recognizes Representative Meuser for 5 minutes.

[No response.]

Mr. KEATING. Representative Meuser?

Mr. MEUSER. Yes, thank you. I was taking it off mute. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our ranking members. Certainly, thank you very much to our witnesses.

Mr. Mitchell, last month, President Biden and the NATO leaders met in Brussels, as we all know, to discuss security challenges and adopt initiatives aimed at strengthening the Alliance and enhancing cohesion among allies.

The leaders for the first time identified China's posing systematic challenges to aligned security and the rules-based international order, and underscored the NATO's relationship with Russia as at its lowest point since the cold war.

NATO's increased focus on China and Russia will be critical to the success of the Alliance going into NATO 2030. However, more needs to be done to ensure our efforts are being matched by other NATO nations.

So Mr. Mitchell, were you satisfied with NATO's response specifically to China from the summit?

Dr. MITCHELL. Well, thank you for that question, sir.

I think it made important contributions. But there's far more that needs to be done. It was a—it was a productive summit and I think specifically on the subject of China, the most important thing that happened was this is the first NATO document that I'm aware of that went as far as it did in acknowledging the threat from China.

So that's, clearly, an important step in the right direction. I think what's missing at this point, and it's been alluded to already in today's conversation, is an indication of what NATO is really willing to do to take on the question of the threat from China.

There are a number of NATO allies who don't want to see NATO play a more forward-leaning role on China. They want to—in many cases, they would wish to reserve that as a competency for the European Union.

I think it's a minority of allies, but it's—their concerns are, effectively, impeding progress on a more substantive agenda, and I think you see it in some of the recommendations from our report on China, which were very specific that didn't make it into the communique.

I mentioned the idea of a coordinating platform similar to the cold war era COCOM structure where the North Atlantic Council could air concerns about Chinese behavior even when NATO itself is not necessarily the tool that's being used to address those concerns, maybe even alongside the European Council.

I think there are steps like that are well within NATO's reach. On the—in the conversation today, we have talked about efforts to improve NATO's technological edge, engage more with Indo-Pacific partners. In short, I think some—the leaders meeting last week was an important step in the right direction. But there's far, far more that needs to be done on China.

Mr. MEUSER. Sure. No, I certainly agree, and that was my next question. Is there consensus within the Alliance? I'll ask this, and quickly. You mentioned a few things there. What would you recommend the Biden administration to do to try to gain such consensus?

Dr. MITCHELL. Well, I think the lead up to the update of the Strategic Concept is a tremendous opportunity for the United States, and I think the Biden administration, in its outreach to NATO allies in that process of updating the Strategic Concept, has an opportunity, for example, to add a fourth core task.

I say add one because we heard from—almost unanimously from capitals across NATO a desire to preserve the existing NATO core tasks. But I think adding a new one that helps to bring in the great power competition frame and helps to bring in the China question would be a logical step in the right direction.

I think the administration can do a lot also to continue the Trump administration's momentum in making China a central topic in trans-Atlantic conversations at both the NATO and the EU level.

And I think, for example, keeping up the momentum on the Clean Network, which effectively jettisons Chinese, Huawei and ZTE 5G operations from a majority of European countries. That would keep up that momentum.

But within a NATO context, specifically, I would emphasize the need for a comprehensive China strategy that outlines the steps that NATO can take to rebut or guard against Chinese activities in the areas of sectors' responsibility that impact readiness, interoperability, and secure communications.

I think there's a lot of low-hanging fruit there, and so I would—I would invest the political efforts on the handful of allies that are the most resistant.

Mr. MEUSER. Great. The concern of Hong Kong or, shall I say, the idea of Taiwan perhaps being—moving in the direction or China imposing itself on Taiwan in the manner it has with Hong

Kong, what would you think NATO's response would be to that and how much of a hypothetical is that at this point in time?

Dr. MITCHELL. Well, I think it's a very real concern and I think from NATO's perspective there are two things. First, on human rights—

Mr. KEATING. I'm sorry, but we're up against a hard stop and we're over the time period.

Mr. MEUSER. I didn't have a clock. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman, I yield.

Mr. KEATING. If we could have that, you know, in writing. I want to thank Representative Meuser, too, for his questioning.

I want to thank all the members of our committee for their participation. I want to thank my co-chair for the hearing, Representative Connolly, for working so hard to organize this hearing, and the members of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly that participated as well.

It's been an important hearing and a forward-looking hearing, and a discussion that will be ongoing. So our period for questioning has now concluded.

The members of the committee will have 5 days to submit statements, extraneous material, and questions for the record, subject to the limitation of the rules.

I want to thank, again, everyone for participating.

And with that, this hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

JOINT COMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, ENERGY, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND CYBER

William R. Keating (D-MA), Chair

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY

Gerald E. Connolly (D-VA), Chairman

June 24, 2021

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to be held jointly by the Subcommittee on Europe, Energy, the Environment, and Cyber and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly via Cisco WebEx (and available live on the Committee website at <https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/>):

DATE: Thursday, June 24, 2021

TIME: 10:00 a.m., EDT

SUBJECT: NATO 2030: A Celebration of Origins and an Eye Toward the Future

WITNESS: His Excellency Anders Fogh Rasmussen
Founder & Chairman
Rasmussen Global
Former Secretary General, NATO
Former Prime Minister of Denmark

The Honorable Rose Gottemoeller
Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne Distinguished Lecturer
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University
Former Deputy Secretary General, NATO
Former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs,
U.S. Department of State

The Honorable Ivo H. Daalder, Ph.D.
President
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Former U.S. Ambassador to NATO

The Honorable A. Wess Mitchell, Ph.D.
Co-Chair
NATO 2030 Reflection Group

Former Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State

By Direction of the Chair

To fill out this form online: Either use the tab key to travel through each field or mouse click each line or within blue box. Type in information.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Note: Red boxes with red type will NOT print.

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON Europe, Energy, the Environment, and Cyber HEARING

Day Thursday Date 06/24/2021 Room Cisco Webex

Starting Time 10:02 Ending Time 12:18

Recesses ☐ (____ to ____) (____ to ____) (____ to ____) (____ to ____) (____ to ____) (____ to ____)

Presiding Member(s)

Chair William R. Keating

Check all of the following that apply:

Open Session ☒

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To select a box, mouse click it, or tab to it and use the enter key to select. Another click on the same box will deselect it.

TITLE OF HEARING:

NATO 2030: A Celebration of Origins and an Eye Toward the Future

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

See Attached

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with an * if they are not members of full committee.)

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes ☒ No ☐

(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.)

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record.)

Ambassador Ivo H. Daalder's Testimony

Ms. Rose Gottemoeller's Testimony

Mr. Anders Fogh Rasmussen's Testimony

Dr. A. Wess Mitchell's Testimony

Representative William R. Keating's Addition to the Record

Representative Linda T. Sanchez's Addition to the Record

Representative Ann Wagner's QFR for Ms. Rose Gottemoeller

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE _____

or

TIME ADJOURNED 12:18

Clear Form

Note: If listing additional witnesses not included on hearing notice, be sure to include title, agency, etc.

Benjamin Cooper
Subcommittee Staff Associate

WHEN COMPLETED: Please print for subcommittee staff director's signature and make at least one copy of the signed form. A signed copy is to be included with the hearing/markup transcript when ready for printing along with a copy of the final meeting notice (both will go into the appendix). The signed original, with a copy of the final meeting notice attached, goes to full committee. An electronic copy of this PDF file may be saved to your hearing folder, if desired.

JOINT HEARING: HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

EUROPE, ENERGY, THE ENVIRONMENT AND CYBER SUBCOMMITTEE

NATO PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY

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CORRECTION

CORRECTION TO PAGE 5 OF ROSE GOTTEMÖLLER'S WRITTEN TESTIMONY

Second, the NATO leadership also undertakes, consistently and persistently, what I call an “inside-out” approach to working the issues at NATO. The alliance consistently embraces democratic values and the rule of law, whether in conducting its daily business, training or exercises. An example of this is how NATO insists on the application of international humanitarian law to targeting policy, and so trains its personnel. This approach to training translates into a group of senior military officers and soldiers from across the alliance who are schooled in basic democratic values.

Third, NATO actively displays these values whenever it shows its public face. **I recollect, for example, the “Trident Juncture 2018” exercise, which was built on the principle of transparency.** It was designed to show-case NATO’s openness, close working relationship with its member states—there was strong public support for the exercise in Norway, where it took place—and allied unity, with good cooperation from the smallest member to the largest. Of course, the Russians received an open invitation to observe the exercise, and they did attend.

These three examples lead me to two recommendations. First, I recommend that NATO should reaffirm its foundational values in the context of the NATO 2030 review and the process of redoing the strategic concept. It is important that these values are front and center at this time, and that NATO send a clear message about them.

Second, I recommend that NATO look for ways to expand resilience in this arena with the establishment of an institutional structure affiliated with NATO. In my view, this structure should be built around the Center of Excellence (COE) concept.

NATO has developed a dynamic network of COEs in recent years that are working on some of the most troubling issues with which the alliance is contending. They are the site of policy innovation in the alliance, and are increasingly being pushed to work together to join forces against the challenges that NATO faces—cyber-attacks, misinformation campaigns, the whole panoply of hybrid challenges. Indeed, the NATO-EU COE on hybrid threats has been cited as a model for developing cooperation with the European Union on democratic resilience. I believe that such a NATO-EU COE on democratic resilience would be the best way to bring innovation to bear on this important problem, and I note that Romania has already offered to host such a center.

Thank you for this opportunity to testify, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your questions and to our discussion.

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

**Questions for the Record Submitted to Ms. Rose Gottemoeller
Representative Ann Wagner
Europe, Energy, the Environment, and Cyber Subcommittee
June 24, 2021**

Question 1:

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the only NATO aspirant with a Membership Action Plan, Russia is exploiting ethnic divisions among Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks to stall Bosnia's accession. And just a few months ago, the Russian embassy in Bosnia issued a statement threatening that, "in the event of practical rapprochement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and NATO, our country will have to react to this hostile step." Ms. Gottemoeller, what can the United States and its NATO allies do to combat these dangerous tactics and deter Russian malign activity in Bosnia?

Answer 1:

NATO must stick to its principles in this regard. In the first instance, NATO is clear that the door to membership remains open, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, with its Membership Action Plan, is clearly on the list of aspirants to join NATO. Second, NATO remains firm in its conviction that states have the right to choose their security arrangements for themselves; no outside entity can dictate it to them.

The NATO Spokesperson Oana Lungescu clearly expressed these principles in her response to the threatening statement. On March 19, she emphasized that every country has its own right to decide how to handle its security and what level of cooperation it might want with the 30-nation NATO alliance. She said, "No third party has the right to intervene or veto such a process. Any threats in this respect are unacceptable. The time of spheres of influence is over." ("Russian warning against NATO membership denounced by Bosnia," *Associated Press*, March 19, 2021.)

STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Statement for the Congressional Record

Rep. Linda T. Sánchez

June 24, 2021

*Joint E3C-NATO PA hearing**“NATO 2030: A Celebration of Origins and an Eye Toward the Future”*

We are living in unprecedented times. Our world is facing global challenges, from pandemics to great power competitions. This is a pivotal moment, and our collective success lies in the strength of our alliances.

I am proud to serve as the Acting Head of the U.S. Delegation to the NATO PA. NATO's core values are rooted in our shared belief in democratic principles. NATO is critical towards fostering global relationships and strengthening the security of both our nation and our allies.

The most important duty of the United States Congress is to protect the American people. Our membership and active participation in NATO is instrumental in that endeavour.

As Special Rapporteur for the Committee on Democracy and Security, I am focused on combatting disinformation and propaganda. From the January 6th attack on the U.S. Capitol to the COVID-19 crisis, we have seen how disinformation threatens our democracy and our constituents.

We must expand our efforts to counter and respond to disinformation with proactive, fact-based, and credible communication. We must also address the vulnerabilities that allow false or misleading information to spread in the first place. To be effective, it is important that we actively combat both of these threats.

I have the honor of working on a draft report for NATO that will offer a set of concrete recommendations to advance these goals. This is no easy task and there are no simple solutions, but, as an Alliance, we need to develop a comprehensive, cooperative, and values-based response to make our democracies and our alliances more resilient.

Our active participation in NATO will help us meet this moment. I will be steadfast in preserving transatlantic cooperation and ensuring that the United States upholds its unshakeable commitment to NATO.

Thank you.

